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Abstract 
 
 
 
This study focuses on human rights and humanitarian intervention debates, and 
aims to analyse humanitarian intervention literature and its critics. To grasp the 
debates better, the Libyan intervention and Gaddafi’s killing will be taken up as 
the case study of the thesis. The study intends to ask these questions: “What are 
the links between the concept of ‘human rights’ and ‘natural rights’?”, “How can 
the instrumentalisation of humanitarian intervention be argued against the theories 
of cultural superiority and post-colonialism?” and “What does Gaddafi’s dead 
body represent in the circumstances of the Libyan intervention?”. The study 
includes news and remarks about the Libyan intervention and Gaddafi’s killing 
from the mainstream newspapers in comparing the theoretical discussions with 
practice. Moreover, the thesis’ general concern is to demonstrate that as long as 
the concept of humanitarian intervention implies the superiority of Western 
oriented values and norms over the boundaries of cultural difference, it creates a 
zone of cultural hierarchy and superiority, and as long as the international powers 
identify the so-called Third World as failed, violent or outlaw, it causes the 
reproduction of colonial stereotypes while masking the role played by the 
international organisations’ priorities in contributing to the humanitarian crises.   
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Özet 
 
 
 
Bu çalışma insan hakları ve insani müdahale tartışmalarına odaklanarak, insan 
hakları literatürünü eleştirileriyle birlikte analiz etmeyi amaçlar. Tartışmaları daha 
iyi kavrayabilmek için, Libya müdahalesi ve Kaddafi’nin öldürülmesi tezin vaka 
incelemesi olarak ele alınacaktır. Tez çalışması şu soruların cevaplarını aramaya 
yöneliktir: “İnsan hakları ve doğal haklar kavramları arasındaki ilişkiler 
nelerdir?”, “İnsani müdahalenin araçsallaştırılması kültürel üstünlük ve post-
kolonyalizm teorileriyle beraber nasıl tartışılabilir?” ve “Kaddafi’nin ölü bedeni 
Libya müdahalesi şartlarında neyi temsil eder?”. Bu çalışma, teorik tartışmaların 
pratikle mukayese edilebilmesi için, Libya müdahalesi ve Kaddafi’nin 
öldürülmesi ile ilgili ana-akım gazetelerden haberler ve görüşler içermektedir. 
Bunlara ek olarak, tezin genel kaygısı şunları gösterebilmektir: İnsani müdahale 
kavramı, kültürel farklılığın sınırlarının ötesinde, Batı merkezli değer ve normları 
kapsadığı sürece, kültürel hiyerarşi ve üstünlük alanı oluşturur; ve uluslararası 
güçler sözde- Üçüncü Dünya’yı başarısız, vahşi ya da suçlu ilan ettiği müddetçe, 
sadece sömürgeci stereotiplerin yeniden üretimi ile karşı karşıya kalmaz, aynı 
zamanda uluslararası kuruluşların önceliklerinin insanlık krizlerine katkılarındaki 
rolünü göremeyiz.   
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 “If today there is no longer any clear figure of the sacred man, it is perhaps 
because we are all virtually homines sacri.” (Agamben, “Homo Sacer”) 
 
I dedicate my thesis to the people who lost their lives during the Gezi Park 
Resistance in several regions of Turkey. A special feeling of respect is due for 
those people who demonstrated again the importance of the struggle for rights.  
I also dedicate this thesis to the people who struggled for their rights and were 
opposed to injustice throughout the history of the world. I will always appreciate 
the way that is illuminated by these honourable people who never waver in their 
fight for their rights.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Libyan intervention and Gaddafi’s1 killing are two important cases within the 
context of human rights and humanitarian intervention debates. These two 
phenomena consist of political processes which are intertwined and interacting. In 
this study, I will examine the Libyan intervention and Gaddafi’s killing in terms 
of the debates of human rights and humanitarian intervention.  
 In the first chapter of this thesis, I will argue the concept of human rights 
and its formation process with regard to the fact that although the concept does 
not have the same meaning as the concept of ‘natural rights’, it has lots of 
similarities. In this regard, the concept of human rights is in one sense the 
successor to natural rights which were developed in Western culture. Human 
rights are assumed equal, inalienable and universal. Herein, a dilemma occurs 
because of the contradiction between the meanings that the concept has (universal, 
individual, indivisible and equal), and normative values from its original culture. 
This is why, in the first chapter, beyond explaining the formation process of the 
concept, I seek to analyse these contradictions.   
 To grasp human rights conceptually, I will tackle a brief history of natural 
rights and refer to the period in which these rights arose. After this analysis, the 
Universal Declaration Model of human rights will be examined. The claim of 
universality seems problematic to the extent that the concept of human rights has 
strong ties to European understanding. As long as what we call human rights 
today refers to a certain democratic regime and civilised society, the concept of 
human rights becomes exclusionary for those who are not within this definition. 
This specific characteristic of human rights, which also causes the exclusion, 
contradicts with its claim of universality. On the contrary, cultural relativism 
leaves room for cultural differences in terms of rights. This approach is also 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 There are many varied spellings for the name of former Libyan leader such as Qaddafi or 
Gadhafi. In this thesis, Gaddafi will be used and in the quotations the authors’ spelling choices will 
be preserved.    
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allocated to the groups in itself as strong radical cultural relativism and weak 
cultural relativism. While the former accepts the culture as the principal source of 
the validity of a right, the latter considers the culture as the secondary source of 
the validity of such a right. Those approaches will be discussed in order to 
enlighten the contradiction of the claim of universality of the Universal 
Declaration Model.  
 After the discussion of the claim of universality, I will query the question 
of what causes these human rights to be identified as ‘individual’. Herein, the 
specific ties of the concept to Western cosmology will be touched upon. The 
social construction of modern Western society tends to see individual actors as the 
ultimate units. However, when it comes to the ‘other’ cultures, group rights can 
come to prominence. As another important characteristic of human rights, namely 
individual rights, will be problematised in terms of the question of how those 
‘individual’ rights can be applied to societies which do not tend to see individuals 
as the ultimate unites of society.   
 For the problem of indivisibility, I will examine the dichotomy between 
positive and negative, and civil and political- socioeconomic rights. Although this 
principle aims to establish a system which tries to make all those rights 
complementary, there is a logical contradiction in their implementation. To 
illustrate, ‘periodic holidays with pay’ as a right is supposedly ensured by Article 
24 of the Universal Declaration. However, this article may be irrelevant to those 
who do not have these social conditions. In other words, by claiming Article 24, a 
right which is relevant only to limited social conditions is universalised.  
 Since states are party to internationally recognized human rights and 
responsible for ensuring them in terms of the obligations that the United Nations 
brings along with its membership, they are accepted as responsible for the 
prosecution of these rights. This state-centric attitude is problematic in the sense 
of degradating the concept of ‘human’ rights into the rights of citizens. This is 
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why the characteristic of a state’s responsibility will be discussed with its 
ambivalence consequently.  
 The first chapter will end with the discussions and critiques of cultural 
imperialism in terms of human rights. Herein, my aim is to argue the ambivalent 
structure of the concept of human rights. The formation process of the notion 
causes the dilemma with its ties to a specific ethical-legal code and its reference to 
a particular kind of political system of which both have European origins. As long 
as those values and codes are used to imply other parts of the world, a cultural 
hierarchy occurs between those who are the intervener and the intervened in terms 
of human rights.  
 In the second chapter, I aim to argue the concept of humanitarian 
intervention and non-interventionist theories to establish a structure for the 
introduction to the case study. Non-interventionism will be discussed within the 
framework of utilitarianism and with the question of whether the intervention has 
moral or legal dimensions. Human rights and humanitarian intervention are 
concepts which go hand in hand in the discussions. This is why this unique 
relationship will be mentioned while the concept of humanitarian intervention is 
being defined.  
 Although states are responsible for ensuring and implementing 
internationally recognized human rights, the United Nations can intervene in the 
domestic jurisdiction of a state by invoking the articles 2(4) and 2(7) with the 
purpose of implementation of human rights. Thus, a contradiction occurs between 
these articles and the non-intervention rule of international relations which 
proclaims that it is not permitted to use force against any state’s territorial 
integrity or political independence. This contradiction will be discussed under the 
heading of sovereignty.  
 Utilitarians may be assumed as defenders of non-interventionism. In this 
context, utilitarians basically tend to calculate the possible consequences of an 
action to decide whether it is favourable or unfavourable. However, it does not 
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mean that utilitarians always have to be non-interventionist. In fact act-utilitarians 
do not refuse any kind of intervention directly, it depends on the calculations used 
to determine general social welfare standards. For this reason, the discussion 
between utilitarians, who can be non-interventionist in some circumstances, and 
liberals, who define themselves as interventionist, will be examined.  
 Moral concern, which can be instrumentalised for humanitarian 
intervention, is an important case for discussion in terms of being disputable. 
Especially, the moral concern of the international community is controversial to 
the extent of entrusting the future of people to the morality of the international 
community. Considering the fact that it is almost impossible to point to universal 
moral arguments and apply them for each case, these moral arguments which 
represent a specific group’s moral system will be questioned.    
 I will concentrate on the discussions of ‘cultural superiority’ and ‘post-
colonial effects’ at the end of this chapter. The axis of the whole study rests on 
these two inferences. Although the discussions that will be held before the end of 
the second chapter are necessary and important, they are steps to reach a body of 
theoretical debate, which is the cultural superiority and post-colonial attitude of 
the humanitarian intervention.   
 I would argue the imperialistic gesture of humanitarian intervention along 
two paths: first, to the extent the concept of humanitarian intervention implies 
Western-oriented values and norms over the boundaries of cultural difference, it 
creates a zone of cultural hierarchy and superiority. Second, as long as the 
international community and international powers declare the so-called Third 
World as failed, violent and outlaw and consider this society as the victims and 
vulnerable, they create a heroic narrative which causes not only the deployment of 
colonial stereotypes but also masks the role played by the international 
organisational priorities in contributing towards humanitarian crises. 
 After structuring this theoretical background, I will concentrate on the case 
study of the thesis: the Libyan intervention and killing of Gaddafi in the third 
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chapter. The Libyan intervention will be touched upon with the theories that are 
argued in the first and second chapters. In this way, the theoretical discussions 
will be matched up with the case study. The Libyan intervention, firstly, will be 
tackled in the context of these discussions: the ‘collectivist or individualist’, the 
‘naturalist approach’, and the ‘sovereignty dilemma’. Then Gaddafi’s killing will 
be discussed within the scope of the questions of whose life is worth to mourn and 
who decides what a human is. After Gaddafi was killed, the media started to 
expose his tormented dead body with widespread coverage. During this media 
presentation, Western states’ authorities uttered some remarks which can be 
regarded as celebratory and imply the success of the humanitarian intervention. 
These remarks will be argued using the theories of biopolitics, unpunishability 
and the outrage over the death.  
 After the discussion of Gaddafi’s death/tormented body and the remarks 
uttered by Western authorities, I will argue dehumanisation in order to melt these 
two cases (Libyan intervention and Gaddafi’s killing) in the same pot. Because 
herein, the dehumanisation of Gaddafi (or any other ousted leader who is called ‘a 
monster’) not only legitimises his killing but also provides the necessary 
apparatus for intervention by claiming Libyans are in need and vulnerable in the 
hands of a ‘dehumanised’ leader.  
 Ultimately, the Libyan intervention and Gaddafi’s killing - as the case 
study of this thesis - and all the theoretical discussions of the thesis will be 
touched upon under the heading of the state of exception. At this point, I aim to 
figure the necessary relationship between the ethical-legal codes that the notion of 
human rights carries, and the intervention in Libya and Gaddafi’s killing. Those 
cases are not separate: on the contrary, they are eclectic. What gathers them under 
a single roof is the positions of those subjects against the sovereign power under 
the state of exception. Therefore, the approach, which leaves no room for cultural 
difference and insists on the universal norms while positioning with a post-
colonial perspective, will be questioned.   
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CONCEPTUALISATION AND FORMATION PROCESS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS   
 
1.1. The Concept of Human Rights 
 
Human rights as the main source of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and several internationally recognized treaties have an important role in 
determining domestic and international policies. Actually, the concept of human 
rights has been located as a subject of international relations for only half a 
century; they were not the subject of international relations before the Second 
World War. However, considering its ties to the concept of natural law, one can 
argue they have been thought of before. The great shift after the Second World 
War is that states’ attitude to their citizens turned into both a legitimate concern 
and subject to international standards. How and why did the concept become so 
important in international relations? To reach an answer to this question, the 
concept should be analysed deeply with its historical background. Therefore, this 
chapter seeks to analyse the concept of human rights, its peculiarities, formation 
process and bonds with natural rights, with a special emphasis on its ambivalent 
structure within the system of international relations.     
Donnelly identifies human rights as the rights people have because they 
are human, and he believes that these rights’ basic and constant features are listed 
as follows: human rights are equal, inalienable and universal.2 What constant 
features mean in theory is that these rights provide the same opportunity for 
everyone to enjoy them (equality); one cannot stop being human (inalienability); 
and all those are effective for all humankind (universality).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), 7-10.  
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Rights which are defined as above have two main types being accepted in 
international treaties and conventions: civil-political and socio-economic rights.3 
Twiss separates these two main types into sub-groups as follows: 
 
Civil-political rights include two sub-types: norms regarding 
physical and civil security (e.g., prohibitions of torture, slavery, 
inhumane punishment, arbitrary arrest; guarantees of legal 
personhood and equality before the law) and norms regarding 
civil and political empowerment (e.g., freedom of thought, 
assembly, voluntary association; guarantees of effective political 
participation in one's society). Socio-economic rights also include 
two sub-types: norms regarding the provision of goods meeting 
basic personal and social needs (e.g., nutrition, shelter, health 
care, education) and norms regarding goods meeting basic 
economic needs (e.g., work and fair wages, adequate living 
standard, a social security net).4 
 
When we speak of human rights in terms of the Universal Declaration, the 
main emphasis shows up as ‘dignity’ for all humankind.5 In other words, instead 
of the ability to create dozens of sub-types and groups, the main principle is to 
protect human dignity and provide everyone with minimum conditions of 
dignified life in the Declaration.   
The questions of who can enjoy the rights and who is responsible to 
protect them are answered in a conventional way of ‘social contract’ 
understanding: A state is required to protect the human rights of everyone within 
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.6 Rights claim includes the two sides as 
‘duty-bearer’ and ‘right-holder’. In this sense human rights should be enjoyed by 
all humankind (right-holder) and provided by the state (duty-bearer). This 
conventional understanding squeezes the human rights debates into the state level 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Sumner B., Twiss, “History, Human Rights, and Globalization,” Journal of Religious Ethics 
Vol.32 No.1 (Spring, 2004): 40. 
4 Sumner B., Twiss, “History, Human Rights, and Globalization”, 40. 
5 “Preamble,” The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, accessed February 12, 2014, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.   
6 “Article 2,” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, accessed February 12, 2014, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.  
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by referring to citizenship. It also brings out the concept of ‘duties’. Galtung 
draws attention to the concept of ‘duties’ of a citizen to the state: “Total rights in 
principle entitle the state to demand total duties in return.”7 In other words, when 
rights are mentioned, so too are duties.  
No concept may pop up in history: it should have reasonable grounds, 
suitable conditions and a gradual formation process. Although the great shift after 
the Second World War has a significant role for modern human rights, it does not 
mean that humankind did not witness the premises of the concept in earlier 
history. For instance, the social construction of today’s international relations 
system is based upon the 1648-Westphalia system, the 1815 Concert of Europe, 
the 1919 League of Nations and ultimately the 1945 United Nations. In other 
words, what we call a ‘great shift’ has also been processed step by step in history.  
The concept of human rights has also evolved in time, and its development 
has been a matter of debate along with its specific ties to Western culture. Thus, in 
the following sections of the first chapter, the relation between the concept of 
human rights and the concept of natural rights and the doctrine of natural law will 
be discussed.  
 
1.1.1. Brief History 
 
i) Natural Rights 
 
Critiques of the concept of human rights generally arise from its roots associated 
with Western culture. In this context, it would be useful to tackle the issue with 
the concept of ‘natural rights’, which is claimed as the basis of the notion. L. 
Holzgrefe identifies natural law as a notion which “… is the naturalist doctrine 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Johan Galtung, Human Rights in Another Key (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 10. 
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that human beings have certain moral duties by virtue of their common 
humanity.”8 In other words, in the natural condition of humankind, everyone had 
the natural right to do anything for their preservation.   
Natural law basically is a doctrine which postulates certain natural or 
divine laws, while positivism postulates no such non-human law, politics or 
morality.9 However, early Roman law had no term for right as we understand 
today. Ius means both right and duty; in the sixth century, the Emperor Justinian 
introduced the notion of natural law (ius naturae).10 Ius naturae was basically an 
‘objective’ system of rights that was not really separable from lex naturalis 
(natural law).11 Pagden claims that what we term today human rights have 
evolved from those which Roman jurists called natural rights.12 On the contrary, 
Freeman states that “there is no direct line from medieval conceptions of ius to 
early modern conception of natural rights.”13 Freeman justifies his argument by 
handling the approach of humanist lawyers of the Renaissance to rights, and 
stresses that they were concerned not with natural rights but with civil rights.14 
 The Roman lawyers proposed natural law as an ideal or standard. Thus it 
was not exemplified in any existing legal code; however, it was a kind of standard 
which remains in nature to be discovered and to be applied by humanity (men).15  
 Hugo Grotius is considered to be the person who provided the basis for a 
secular theory of natural rights. The main reason why Grotius is regarded as the 
founder of modern natural law is his secularization of the doctrine. What he has 
done is to maintain that the theory of natural law does not logically require belief 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 J. L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” in Humanitarian Intervention Ethical, 
Legal and Political Dilemmas, ed. J.L. Holzgrefe and O. Keohane, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), 25. 
9 Henrik Syse, Natural Law, Religion, & Rights (South Bend, Ind., St.: Augustine Press, 2007), 2. 
10 Anthony Pagden, “Human Rights, Natural Rights and Europe’s Imperial Legacy,” Political 
Theory, Vol.31, No.2 (Apr. 2003), 174. 
11 Henrik Syse, Natural Law, Religion, & Rights, 5. 
12 Anthony Pagden, “Human Rights, Natural Rights and Europe’s Imperial Legacy,” 174. 
13 Michael Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2005), 18. 
  14 Michael Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 19-20. 
15 Margaret MacDonald, “Natural Rights,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society New Series Vol.47 (1946-1947):229.  
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in the existence of God.16 As Benjamin Straumann states, Groutius says that his 
work in natural law “… does not depend upon an interpretation of Holy Writ in 
which many people find many things they cannot understand.”17 For Grotius, “… 
men had natural rights, but these were transformed by society. He conceived of 
ius both as what is just and as the ability.”18 In Grotius’ idea of the ability to 
preserve one’s life, liberties and property, the community’s help is crucial, and 
these rights can be enjoyed by the members of one’s society as well as 
humankind. Herein, we encounter two main arguments: the basic form of 
‘universality’ (that rights can be enjoyed by everyone) and the ‘secular’ meaning 
of the rights (society is able to transform the rights and they have exact duties). In 
a sense, his theory is a combination of ancient and modern rights because, as it 
will be seen below, those arguments are not totally different from those that 
ancient premises tendered. Straumann stresses that Grotius’s theory is not totally 
clear of what Ancient Roman jurists enhanced considering the following grounds: 
first, Grotius aimed to put forward secular, neutral natural law; second, Roman 
law had already enhanced a doctrine of the freedom of the high seas; third, 
analogies between Roman imperialism and Dutch expansion made political and 
legal theory particularly attractive for Grotius; and last, Roman law provided a 
fair amount of rights for foreigners, especially merchants, for trade-driving 
economic activities.19   
Thomas Hobbes did not actually reject the concept of natural law but 
rather transformed it. Hobbes defines the law of nature (lex naturalis) in 
Leviathan as follows: “[Lex Naturalis]... is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out 
by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his 
life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Michael Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 19. 
17 Benjamin Straumann, “Is Modern Liberty Ancient? Roman Remedies and Natural Rights in 
Hugo Grotius’s Early Works on Natural Law,” Law and History Review, Vol.27 No:1 (Spring 
2009), 62.  
18 Michael Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 19. 
19 Benjamin Straumann, “Is Modern Liberty Ancient? Roman Remedies and Natural Rights in 
Hugo Grotius’s Early Works on Natural Law,” 62-63. 
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he thinketh it may be best preserved.”20 Freeman explains Hobbes’ natural law 
envisagement for humankind under the natural conditions in this way:    
 
In the natural condition of mankind, everyone had the natural 
right to do anything that was conductive to their preservation [...] 
The natural condition of mankind was one of each against 
everyone else, and therefore one of great insecurity[...] All men 
were obliged to obey this sovereign, provided that he did not 
threaten preservation.21  
 
In the 17th century, Hobbes caused a breakpoint in the natural law doctrine 
by separating human’s aim from God’s and nature’s objective rule, and 
emphasized the subjective will of the human in the lack of those binding rules. 
This secularization effort of natural law does not mean that he rejected God’s will 
at all. Henrik Syse indicates that Hobbes tried to avoid the obvious charges which 
would be raised against him by religious followers of natural law theory and 
interprets him as a secularized nominalist who saw the natural right of a human 
being prior to any teaching of religious truth.22 Basically for Hobbes, peace and 
self-preservation were prior to anything in the sense of natural rights. Syse 
remarks how Hobbes dealt with the concepts of ‘sovereign’, ‘human’ and ‘laws of 
nature’ in his theory: “...while the subjects are bound to obey no laws but the 
sovereign’s, [...], the sovereign himself is bound by the laws of nature. He is thus, 
restrained by nature and by nature’s God.”23    
 One of the most important differences that Hobbes drew attention to is the 
distinction of right (jus) and law (lex). He parses sharply these two notions 
because for him the former means liberty while the latter means restriction.24 Thus 
it is possible to say that those two notions are contradistinctive to each other in 
Hobbesian theory.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XIV, ed. Richard Tuck, (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 91. 
21 Michael Freeman, Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 19. 
22 Henrik Syse Natural Law, Religion, & Rights, 157-177. 
23 Henrik Syse, Natural Law, Religion, & Rights, 154. 
24 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 91. 
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 Both Hobbes and Grotius strove to redefine natural law in terms of 
humankind’s emergence from the state of nature to a progress in civil society. 
While Grotius aimed at secularization of these rights, Hobbes carried the doctrine 
one level up and transformed ius naturae to the ‘subjective’ natural right. 
Although Hobbes remarked that all people (men) were obliged to obey the 
sovereign, he left no room for eternal and unconditional sovereignty for rulers; on 
the contrary, he opened a space to humankind to use their subjective rights if 
threatened by a lack of preservation. In other words, what differentiates Hobbes 
from Grotius is that Hobbes emphasised the subject’s role and will on her/his own 
subjective rights under the conditions of lack of preservation, rather than 
unconditionally obeying the sovereign.  
 John Locke may be the most popular name when it comes to modern and 
contemporary natural rights debates. Locke, who held each individual as a rational 
and active creature, claimed that one had a responsibility to God to pursue the law 
of nature.25 In other words, reason discovers what God has decreed. He offered a 
list of three basic human rights such as to live, liberty and property.26 He also 
offered a social contract theory with the context of natural rights:  
 
In ‘the state of nature’, in the absence of government, everyone 
had the right to self-defence and to enforce the laws of nature. 
Since everyone was judge in their own cause, they would be 
partial to themselves, and this would lead to conflict. Rational 
individuals would therefore agree to live under a government that 
was entrusted to enforce the law of nature and protect the natural 
rights of all through the rule of law, and to promote the public 
good.27 
 
On the other hand, Locke annotated that when those governments choose 
tyranny, people have the right to resist them. Locke’s attempt to harmonize 
natural rights to both classical natural law and ius naturae is distinguishable. His 
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reference to God and His absolute power is associated with an objective approach 
to rights. However, he provides an extensive freedom to individuals by referring 
to the rational mind that ensures a choice of their own badness or goodness, which 
may be associated with subjective rights. In other words, he submits preservation 
to rights by their objectivity, and universality, and besides he emphasizes 
individuality and subjectivity. 
 Syse stresses that although Locke used the term natural rights, he never 
defined it as clearly as does Hobbes, and that Locke used the concept of natural 
law in a much more traditional way than Hobbes did.28 Since he is rational, Locke 
presumed that humanity (men) was subject to the law of nature even before the 
establishment of civil society. Nonetheless, Hobbes asserted a theory which 
accepts this state of nature in another way. For Hobbes, a state of nature meant 
chaos and all humankind was at war with it. This is why Hobbes emphasised the 
right of preservation as the natural right because in a chaotic situation it might 
make sense sufficiently.   
 
ii) Revolutions and the Decline of Natural Rights 
 
Since the 18th and 19th centuries, there has been a great shift in the notion of 
natural rights. By the 18th century, liberals targeted the governments which were 
not successful in providing for the rights of people and they pushed them to 
reform. They even strove to displace them. In this atmosphere, “… the natural 
right to freedom of conscience was held to entail the principle that the state should 
not discriminate against anyone on the ground of religion...”29 This was an 
important threshold for debates of natural and human rights because people’s 
right-seeking became the ‘citizen’s struggle against states. This means that ‘rights 
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of man’ became the rights of the citizen and the notion of natural rights became a 
concept which lies on the level of states and social contract.  
 In 1789, the National Assembly proclaimed the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and the Citizen in France. It was obvious that there was an emphasis on 
‘citizen’ here as if it was something different from human (man). By 1848 this 
language was going to be clearer in France: the Constitution of the Second 
Republic spoke of ‘rights and duties anterior and superior to the positive laws’30 
so the rights were neither natural nor even for humans, but for citizens.  
 Freeman attributes the decline of natural rights to secularization: “It 
[natural rights] suffered philosophically from uncertain foundations once its 
theological basis had faded.”31 Thus the approach which asserted that morality 
and politics had to be derived from nature by reason could not survive.  
 While natural rights were suffering, Immanuel Kant enhanced his own 
theory about rights. As Pagden indicates, Kant declared the ‘highest purpose of 
nature’ with his expression ‘a universal cosmopolitan existence’. For Kant, all 
nations stand originally in a community of land. Thus natural rights extend to all 
human beings without considering their nationality, so they should be understood 
as the citizens of the world.32 Kant also brought a new perspective against the idea 
which tied natural law to ‘reason’: As Leonard Krieger states, Kant separated the 
faculty of understanding from the faculty of reason. According to Kant, the laws 
of nature were produced by the faculty of understanding, and we had to omit the 
realm of the moral from the natural because the moral realm had its laws but these 
are categorically distinct from the law of nature.33  
 Edmund Burke, another important figure in natural rights’ critics, objected 
to the universalism of natural rights because of its failure to take account of 
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national and cultural diversity.34 He did not fully reject the concept of natural 
rights – he noticed the natural rights to life, liberty, freedom of conscience, the 
fruits of one’s labour, property and equal justice, but he saw the concept as useless 
metaphysical abstraction and that was the rights of man -social rather than 
natural.35 
 Another important name criticising natural rights, Jeremy Bentham, was in 
quest of establishing the law on a rational basis. Since natural law was fictitious, it 
was not appropriate for his rational understanding. Freeman explains why 
Bentham rejected the concept of natural rights as follows: “Claims of natural 
rights were vague, and so they could not be objectively evaluated, and disputes 
over natural rights were therefore likely to be settled by violence.”36 In other 
words, for Bentham what were called natural rights were non-sense and they 
could only cause instability in a society because of their vagueness. Bentham’s 
other objection was to the absoluteness of natural law, one’s claim to rights might 
conflict with another’s, so the theory of natural rights failed to provide a clear 
criterion for its limitation37 as his implication for utility was.  
 Pagden alleges that Bentham’s reaction was against the natural law 
concept of the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen’ rather than early 
modern natural law traditions.38 Actually this assertion squares with what 
Freeman indicates in his book about Bentham. According to Freeman, “[o]nce 
natural rights had been detached from the concept of divine law, Bentham argued, 
they were based on nothing at all.”39 It was not a coincidence that Burke’s 
demand from his French correspondent to “take a closer look not at humans as 
natural agents but at ‘men in the concrete’ and at their share in a common human 
life”40 was the time in which a secularized conception of human rights (The 
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Rights of Man and the Citizen) emerged.  All those philosophers developed their 
thoughts in a period in which natural law and the doctrine of rights were cornered 
in the context of the traditional concept of natural law and disengagement of its 
divine meaning. 
 Kreiger purports that there are three peculiarities about the history of 
natural law: first, the doctrine of natural law has been a central and continuous 
concept in Western thought from the ancient Greeks well into the modern period 
(longevity); second, despite its decline at the end of  the 18th century in 
mainstream Western thought, it has maintained its importance to inspire 
intellectual movements in the 19th and 20th centuries (continuity); and its final 
peculiarity is that the 21st century is witnessing a revival of natural rights with its 
discrepancy.41      
 To sum up, along with the 18th and 19th centuries, the concept of natural 
rights transformed to a different pattern in comparison with its ancient version 
both in theory and practice. This great shift was observable in European 
governance regimes, especially with the ‘right of man’. What was termed ‘natural 
right’ turned into ‘civil’ and ‘political’ rights – especially by the French 
Revolution and its declaration. Both Pagden and Freeman tackle this era (from the 
18th century till the Second World War) as a period which contains the decline of 
natural rights in the traditional sense. While Freeman believes it happened 
because of the rupture of natural law from its traditional divine meaning, Pagden 
indicates especially natural law’s new concept as the ‘right of man’ under a 
specific democratic (basically European) regime. Pagden accuses utilitarianist 
liberal tradition which saw rights as something that could be spoken of within 
what had come to be called ‘civilization’- was roughly a reference to the value 
system of Europeans.42 Pagden explains what the duality between nature and 
society caused with his own words:  
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The distinction between nature and society, between the rights a 
person might hold as an individual and those he or she might hold 
as member of a given community, which both the Thomists and 
the modern theorists of the natural law had fought to keep 
separate, albeit with limited degrees of success, had now 
collapsed altogether.43 
 
Consequently in the 19th century, utilitarianism suppressed the concept of 
natural rights. As John Stuart Mill said, ‘barbarians’, who are not civilised as 
Europeans, did not have rights as ‘nations’ had: only members of nations could 
have rights.44 
 
1.2. Universal Declaration Model 
 
1.2.1. After 1945: A New Age  
 
When we speak of modern human rights, it is almost impossible to grasp the 
notion without analysing its historical bond to Nazi Germany and the Second 
World War. Until 10th December 1948 - before the General Assembly of the 
United Nations proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights- 
humankind had witnessed many atrocities prior to and during the Second World 
War, especially against the Jews committed by Nazi Germany. Therefore, as 
Twiss signifies, almost all human rights, which were in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, “...addressed and readdressed the dehumanizing techniques and 
conditions imposed by Nazi Germany on Jews...”45  
 Although utilitarianism suppressed the concept of natural rights in the 19th 
century, it could not avoid the chain of satire. Freeman explains why utilitarianism 
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was defeated by the concept of human rights in the 20th century which points to 
the failure of both utilitarianism and scientific positivism to explain the evil 
‘nature’ of Nazism: according to him, ‘The language of human rights seemed 
much more appropriate’ to explain this evil nature.46 Thus, the main aim of the 
Universal Declaration was, Donnelly says, to specify minimum conditions for a 
dignified life – and a life worthy of a human being - like any list of human 
rights.47  
 After the Second World War, the United Nations Organization was 
established in order to maintain the new world order. When the preamble to the 
charter of the United Nations is viewed, the following Article attracts the 
attention: “[It is determined] to reaffirm fate in fundamental human rights in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and 
of nations large and small”.48 Herein, it is possible to observe that the ‘new world 
order’ also meant a precaution that might halt the atrocities against humankind. In 
other words, it is not a coincidence that the chief aim of the organization 
emphasises the need to secure human rights after all historical experiences. Note 
that, Article 55 lays stress on the universality: the United Nations shall promote 
“universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”49 Taken together, 
it would be concluded that the United Nations aimed to provide a dignified life for 
all humankind to halt the atrocities in theory, and it tried to strengthen this effort 
not only with the emphasis on human rights in its charter, but also by proclaiming 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
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i) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
On 10th December 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
endorsed, by vote of 48-0 (with 8 abstentions), by the United Nations General 
Assembly.50 Donnelly’s approach to the concept of human rights in terms of the 
purposes of international action is mainly based on the ‘Universal Declaration 
Model’ which associates human rights roughly with what is in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.51 He indicates four ‘merits’, in his own words, to 
understand the Universal Declaration Model of which features have strong bonds 
with what we call modern human rights: first, these rights are universal; second, 
all the rights in the Universal Declaration are the rights of ‘individuals’, not 
corporate entities (except self-determination); third, internationally recognized 
human rights are a whole package, therefore one cannot choose any of them by 
not choosing the others within the package, they are indivisible; fourth, these 
rights are the rights of everyone (universality) and can be held by everyone 
equally. However, states have a responsibility to implement them.52  
 
ii) Universality vs. Cultural Relativism  
 
Herein, it should be questioned whether it is possible to be universal by carrying 
the characteristics of Western thought. The claim to universality of the Universal 
Declaration is maybe the most targeted characteristic which is generally criticised.   
 The Universal Declaration model obviously was developed against Nazi 
ideology, bearing traces of neo-Lockean political theory. Using the concept of 
human rights rather than natural right does not necessarily mean that those two 
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concepts are completely different. In fact, as Freeman underlines, replacement of 
the concept of ‘natural rights’ with ‘human rights’ may only have helped to 
eliminate the controversial philosophical implications (as indicated above) of 
grounding rights in nature.53 If it is examined carefully, it is clearly seen that the 
Universal Declaration tries to put norms to make a deal generally rather than 
emphasising values and beliefs by comparison with the concept of natural rights. 
On the other hand, it becomes more controversial because of being parallel to the 
Lockean tradition of Western thought, which means that it is not a total break 
from the Western value system and it is a concept of the Western system of liberal 
thought. “To establish human rights, a different kind of law is necessary; some 
version of natural law.”54  
 Pagden underlines that what we call human rights have strong ties with 
European understanding and they refer specifically to a certain democratic regime 
and civilised society; therefore, he finds the concept of human rights exclusionary 
in terms of its approach to the ‘other’ by designating them ‘outlaw’ or ‘rogue’.55  
Chris Brown also remarks from a liberal perspective of human rights that 
those rights are universal, they are associated with a particular kind of society (as 
indicated before by ‘civilised society’) and liberals agree that those rights can be 
promoted by promoting ‘this’ kind of society.56 However, Brown adds that “...the 
international [human rights] regime which attempts on a global scale to promote 
decontexualised human rights is engaging in a near-impossible task.”57 He 
criticises the approach which seeks the Good according to universal norms settled 
in 1945, and instead of doing that, he says, we can find ‘different and potentially 
competing accounts of Good’ in the present international order.58  
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In Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Donnelly introduces 
two approaches to explain the struggle between universalism and cultural 
relativism such as ‘radical universalism’ and ‘radical cultural relativism’. Radical 
cultural relativism acknowledges that culture is the main source of the validity of 
a moral right or rule, while radical universalism, on the contrary, holds that 
culture is irrelevant to the validity of moral rights and rules.59 He also suggests the 
concepts of ‘strong cultural relativism’ and ‘weak cultural relativism’: the former 
accepts that culture is the principal source of validity of a right or rule, that but it 
leaves a space for a few basic rights with virtually universal application; the latter 
considers that culture is the secondary source of validity of a right or rule. For 
Donnelly the latter can be also termed ‘strong universalism’.60 Radical 
universalism not only contains the dangers of moral imperialism, but also assumes 
a constant ‘human nature’ to determine general and universal rules. And this is 
extremely problematic because human nature itself can also be relative. On the 
other hand, radical cultural relativism leaves no room to determine any human 
rights because it accepts that all moral values are determined solely by culture. 
For Donnelly, radical cultural relativism is a problem because in a community 
there are several moral variations but he does not tend to ignore culture totally: He 
defines himself as a ‘weak cultural relativist’, or ‘strong universalist’ in this 
case.61 It is agreeable that there are some existing cross-culturally valid moral 
values. However, making them primary and declaring them universal - in any 
condition - by putting any value to the top of the list, would be cultural 
imperialism in the sense of hierarchy among the cultures.  
Galtung another name insisting that the concept of human rights are quite 
Western, stresses that there are no such universal laws in the legal sense because 
’law’ may mean very different things to different cultures and the main problem 
with cultural universalism is that “...infractions of human rights are evaluated and 
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adjudicated according to Anglo-Saxon/Nordic standards, also when these may not 
be the standards of the local culture.” 62  
As can be seen, Universalist ideology of the concept of human rights is 
seen as problematic in the sense of denying local social practices and values. It 
also causes a hierarchal value system that specifies which culture is essential to 
the universal norms. Nevertheless it still seems that it is troublesome to speak of 
human rights without basic norms of arbitration. The Universal Declaration 
Model of rights has quite strong ties with its Western predecessor, namely, natural 
rights. Besides, its formation process is, for sure, based on the history of Western 
rights theories. Even though the United Nations’ Declaration has been universal in 
principle, it was approved by the political powers in that time. Herein, it should be 
questioned whether the participation of the new states in the United Nations 
makes its goals more universal or not. Freeman points out the representation 
problem as follows: 
Some states that played leading roles in drafting and approving 
the declaration had colonial empires, and much of the world’s 
population lived under colonial rule. Since the adaption of the 
declaration, UN membership has more than trebled, with new 
members coming overwhelmingly from Africa and Asia. This has 
raised the question as to the applicability of the declaration to 
these countries...Nevertheless the Western states, including those 
from Latin America, were dominant. 63  
  
Herein, Rawls’ conception of human rights in The Law of Peoples may 
contribute to the discussion of ‘universality’. Charles R. Beitz deals with Rawls’ 
conception of human rights in The Law of Peoples as a practical way to approach 
the ‘role’ of human rights.64 Because, for Beitz, “... practical views treat the 
question of the justification of human rights as separable from the question of 
nature.” and what Rawls seeks in The Law of Peoples is quite similar to this view 
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by emphasising the ‘common’ rather than ‘universal’, and giving priority to the 
role of human rights.65 Rawls holds that human rights are binding on all peoples 
and societies but he does not claim that these rights belong to human beings in 
virtue of their common ‘humanity’ nor “... they are universal in the sense of being 
recognized by all significant cultural moral codes.”66 Then, what does it mean to 
be common but not universal? Beitz explains Rawls’ idea as following: “They 
[human rights] can be said to be common to all persons only in a special sense, 
internal to the Law of Peoples: they are compatible with all reasonable political 
doctrines, including those of both ‘liberal’ and ‘decent’ peoples.”67 In other 
words, Rawls stresses that there is no need for a single, commonly agreed 
justification of human rights; members of each type of society would presumably 
internalise human rights for their own reasons. Beitz identifies how Rawls 
classifies the rights which do not require specifically a liberal government or the 
Western tradition, but a ‘common good idea of justice’ as follows: 
 
Human rights “proper” include rights to life (including “the 
means of subsistence”), personal liberty (including liberty, 
though not equal liberty, of conscience), personal property and 
equal treatment under law. These rights are essential to any 
“common good idea of justice” and therefore are not “peculiarly 
liberal or special to the Western tradition.”... His own account of 
the distinction relies on an idea of reasonable toleration among 
peoples-specifically, toleration by liberal societies of those non-
liberal societies which he labels as “decent hierarchical 
peoples.”68    
 In a sense, Rawls sees some rights as common under the ‘common good 
idea of justice’ and it is possible to implement them in a society with decent 
hierarchical peoples. Rawls’ theory can be a good position against the perspective 
of radical universalism which tends to ignore cultural codes and differences.  
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iii) Individuality 
 
Rights, as indicated before, are assumed to be the rights of individuals because it 
is thought that only individuals should be considered human beings. Thus, only 
individuals have human rights. It is intrinsic to the liberal arguments of 
predecessors, and human rights are not totally free from the concept of natural 
rights. What ‘individual’ means here is neither the atomistic individual nor the 
community. Membership of a community is essential when it comes to explain the 
human rights of an individual in a community as a social practice. It can be herein 
questioned whether it refers to the rights of individuals or a community. Donnelly 
stresses that it is important to take into account individuals as ones who can hold 
the rights as the members of a protected group but individually. To be more 
specific, Donnelly says “Even where group membership is essential to the 
definition of a human right, however, the rights are held by individual members of 
protected groups and not by the group as a collective entity.”69 However Article 
16 of the Declaration indicates that “The family is the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”70 This 
is the only reference to a collective right in the Declaration. While Freeman sees 
this right as an “unusual example of a collective right in the declaration.”71, 
Donnelly underlines that families are ‘associations of rights-holding individuals’ 
and “… [families] may not exercise their rights in ways that infringe on the 
human rights of their members (or on any other persons)”72 This is why, Donnelly 
claims, that even in this structure, Article 16 secures the individualistic character 
of the Declaration by grasping the concept as ‘individuals in a group’.  
 Galtung, who identifies human rights as norms which concern and protect 
human existence, explains the international human rights system with the 
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components such as norm-sender (the United Nations), norm-receivers (states) 
and norm-objects (individuals).73 With the effect of Westernness, which includes 
individualism within strong competitive relationships, the Universal Declaration 
Model deals with rights at the level of the individual. For Galtung, since 
individuals are the norm-objects and correlated with the norms, human rights 
become individual rights too, and it causes the exclusion of the collective rights to 
the extent of rights’ Westernness.74 Galtung clarifies why the Western attitude 
places the individuals at the center of rights, rather than dealing with groups as 
follows:  
   
Western cosmology defines individual actors as the ultimate units 
of social construction, the social atoms or building bricks so to 
speak. In this perspective groups might not only constrain the free 
unfolding of individuals through obligations of solidarity; they 
are also less ‘real’. Individuals are born, mature and die; but in 
between they are real, with inalienable rights. How can groups 
with no clear birth and death dates be capable of serving as norm-
objects?75 
 
iv) Indivisibility 
 
Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was declared, a lot of 
internationally recognized human rights treaties have been established to fill the 
gaps adjunct to the Universal Declaration. The Vienna Declaration, which was 
declared in 1993, states that “All human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated.”76 (Article 5) However, there are some arguments 
which stress a dichotomy between socioeconomic and civil and political rights. As 
Donnelly points out, Cranston remarks that some socioeconomic rights are not 
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available for all human beings so there is no sense in calling them human rights. 
For instance, “Cranston notes that right to work, like many other economic and 
social rights, refers directly to a particular class of people rather than all human 
beings.”77  
Johan Galtung also distinguishes negative and positive rights as follows: 
“The negative human rights limit l’état gendarme, the positive human rights 
define l’état providence, the state as a provider, with the individuals having claims 
on the state, not only against the state as for the negative rights.”78 and he 
correlates those two dichotomies (positive-negative and civil and political-
socioeconomic) as follows: “The civil and political rights are often seen as being 
more of the first kind, and the economic, social and cultural rights as more of 
second.”79 On the other hand, Donnelly proffers to transcend the dichotomy 
between socioeconomic and civil and political rights not to allow ruling elites to 
violate human rights by ensuring benefits of dichotomy.80 He tackles all those 
rights as complementary to each other – i.e. the social and cultural right to 
education may ensure the civil and political rights to freedom of speech, belief - 
and consider them equivalently precarious – i.e. the right to work is instrumentally 
and intrinsically valuable like political participation.81    
Although it seems important to blend both civil and political and 
socioeconomic rights, and to regard them as complementary on behalf of enjoying 
those rights as a whole, it does not eliminate the logical contradictions. For 
instance, Article 24 of the Universal Declaration states that “Everyone has the 
right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and 
periodic holidays with pay.”82 But considering the phrase ‘periodic holidays with 
pay’, it looks like the article universalizes a right which is relevant only to limited 
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social conditions.83 Thus, if human rights are universal and relevant to all human 
beings, the rights should cover everyone without any exception. Hence, this 
situation looks like a strong paradoxical phenomenon in terms of a dichotomy of 
human rights being necessary or not. 
 
v) A State’s Responsibility   
 
Since states are parties to internationally recognized human rights and responsible 
for ensuring human rights in terms of the obligations that the United Nations 
brings along with its membership, they are accepted as responsible for prosecution 
of the rights, as indicated before. However Article 2(7) of the Charter of the 
United Nations annotates that the United Nations is not authorised to intervene in 
the domestic jurisdiction of any state, which empathises relatively the internal 
independence of the states in international relations: “Nothing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter […]”84 
The rest of the article clarifies under which conditions the United Nation has the 
right to intervene, but this will be argued below.  
The United Nations’ human rights system, which was termed basically the 
Universal Declaration Model in the previous parts of this thesis, may be termed a 
‘regime’ because it consists of “[…] a set of norms and institutions that is 
accepted by states as binding.”85 This regime, as seen before, is foundation of the 
Universal Declaration. This regime holds states responsible to provide at least 
minimum conditions for implementation of human rights (see preamble to the 
charter of the United Nations) and this is based on the realist paradigm of 
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international relations which strengthened and became widespread after the 
Second World War. Nevertheless, the state-centric conception of human rights 
pertains not only to the modern approach but also to historical understanding. 
Historically, liberal social contract theory, which sees that there is a contract 
between rulers and people to protect people’s rights by a legitimate power (state), 
also gives the state a ‘central’ role. Donnelly also draws attention to the state-
centric conception and highlights the similarity between old and new approaches: 
“[…] the contractarian notion of the state as an instrument for the protection, 
implementation, and effective realization of natural rights is strikingly similar to 
the conception of the state in international human rights instruments.”86  
Galtung also draws attention to the state-centric conceptualization between 
old and new forms of human rights (natural rights) with the ‘transpersonal’ 
characteristic of human rights: pointing the transcendental principle which was 
God in old times and is now His successors such as the king, the state, the United 
Nations, etc., he expresses that the state is constructed in the image of the king by 
receiving legitimacy both from the state community (the United Nations) and 
from the people, which makes the new social contract look like the old one that 
was conceptualized as the allegiance to the ruler (or authority) in return for 
protection and assistance.87  
 The state-centric attitude, firstly, may degrade the concept of human 
rights into the rights of citizens; secondly it carries the issue into the stage of 
states, which may promote the strong realist paradigm without considering other 
components of the international system; and finally, it mostly advocates that the 
states are the main protectors. However, they are not only main protectors but also 
the principal violators. It becomes difficult to see the states as protectors when it 
comes to political and civil rights. In the case of economic rights, states may act 
as providers of rights to property with its liberal background which has 
historically defended the right to property as a bourgeoisie tradition. But should 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 35. 
87 Johan Galtung, Human Rights in Another Key, 17-18. 
  29 
!
we expect that the state plays a positive role with regards to political and civil 
rights? For instance, in case of discrimination or police violence against its own 
citizens, how often do we witness that the state acts as a positive protector that 
ensures human rights without being biased? It seems that states, which are the 
source of power itself, have no chance to be ‘eternal’ and unconditional protectors 
of human rights but inevitable violators of them.   
 
1.3. Critiques  
 
Up to the end of the first chapter, I have tried to demonstrate first, the formation 
process of the concept of human rights in association with the natural law doctrine 
and the concept of natural rights; second, the Universal Declaration Model and its 
peculiarities under the name of modern human rights; third, the critiques to the 
concept of human rights and the Universal Declaration Model, which are related 
to its claims such as being universal and individual by repudiating cultural 
differences and imposing Western values as universal norms.  
The strategy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not to find 
out a middle way to reach common values and beliefs. On the contrary its strategy 
was to reach agreements on norms which were raised from the value system of the 
West within its historical background. Does it mean that we should give up on the 
rights or ignore the violence of the rights? Surely not. But it is necessary to 
confront the ambivalent structure of the concept.  
 Cultural imperialism, as argued in the sections above, is the most 
important critique to the concept of international human rights in the context of 
universality and individualism. Donnelly argues that acting on behalf of human 
rights does not mean imposing one’s own values on other countries and if the 
human rights policies are based on norms which are authoritative international 
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human rights norms, it does not necessarily reflect moral imperialism.88 Firstly, he 
defends this idea by recalling the fact that the Universal Declaration was adapted 
without any single dissident vote. But it is a poor claim to say that the decisions 
are universal norms and facts just because they were approved by political powers 
at that time. It seems more cyclical than universal. Secondly, he remarks that we 
cannot simply ignore several cases such as torture, disappearances, arbitrary arrest 
and detention, racism and so on in the name of diversity or respect for cultural 
tradition.89 This assertion is partly true but deficient. To highlight cultural 
differences and to refuse a repressive universality does not necessarily mean that 
people are on the side of the oppressors. Actually, this approach itself is 
problematic because it means that if one emphasises cultural difference or refuses 
universal truth -which means one refuses the fruits of ‘enlightened’ Western 
ideology-, then one has to be on the side of the oppressors. It seems that the author 
leaves no room for local or cultural norms to be able to do the ‘right thing’. Thus, 
we confront a subject who is capable of knowing everything with ‘reason’, and 
this is almost the same figure introduced by the 17th century’s concept of natural 
rights. Another problem which emerges from Donnelly’s suggestion is that he 
insists on not conniving with these ‘inhuman’ conditions by applying the 
universal human rights standards; however, the authorities of this Universal 
Declaration Model have ignored human rights violations in several cases by 
pointing to those whose lives are worth living and what it really means to be 
human.90 Therefore, I assert that there is an ambivalent nature in the Universal 
Declaration Model and its sanctions.    
 Another dilemma related to the concept of human rights is the ambiguity 
of ‘human’. Freeman criticises Donnelly’s definition of human rights: “Donnelly 
says that human rights are the rights one has simply because one is a human 
being. This is a very common and very unsatisfactory formulation. It is not clear 
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why one has any rights simply because one is a human being.”91 Also in the 
Universal Declaration it maintains its ambiguity as to why one has human rights. 
For instance, Article 22 begins with the expression “Everyone, as a member of 
society, has the right to social security”92, so herein having rights is bound to 
becoming a member of society. Also Article 21, which states that “Everyone has 
the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives”93, is selective because it does not cover the underage 
citizens. 
 It seems that it has not been grounded philosophically why one has rights, 
except by reason of being human. However, in my estimation, what is termed 
‘human’ in the declaration mainly refers to the ‘citizens’ of a state. Because 
whoever has such rights also has duties as a citizen in the sense of a social 
contract. As long as the concept of human rights is explained in this mutual 
relationship (rights and duties), it is in conformity with the state-centric structure. 
Pagden points out that the application of human rights requires a certain 
democratic regime and a civilised society, and this seems quite like the ‘rights of 
man (citizen)’ in the European sense rather than a universal characteristic.94 If the 
modern concept of human rights is a return to its natural law heritage, and if we 
speak of the citizen’s rights against the state and the citizen’s duties under the 
name of ‘human rights’, it is essential to clarify one point: what we call human 
rights (which is accepted universal and equal for everyone), loses its 
characteristics – mainly those two mentioned before - at the moment in which the 
concept is not applied within the nation-state. Giorgio Agamben, whose theories 
will be touched upon in the third chapter, states the same concern as follows: “In 
the system of the nation-state, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man 
show themselves to lack every protection and reality at the moment in which they 
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can no longer rake the form of rights belonging to citizens of a state.”95 In the 
Universal Declaration Model which prioritizes the nation-state system as the 
dominant actor and charges the state with the protection of these rights, human 
beings do not actually have the ‘human’ rights because they are human. They may 
enjoy their human rights only if they are the members of a democratic society 
and/or are the citizens of a state.  
 Although international sanctions are one of the most popular debates in 
human rights, and are also the subject of this thesis, authors such as Donnelly 
stresses that the solution to human rights violations can be found at state, rather 
than international, level.96 Those states which are assumed as the main actors of 
an international regime should be willing to fulfil the minimum requirements that 
are necessary for the protection of human rights. Thus again, we are returning to 
the argument which puts the states at the centre of the application of rights. 
 Pointing out this ambivalent structure does not mean that the concept of 
human rights and its claims are completely in vain. Its occurrence was really 
important during the period in which the Nazis made major human rights 
violations, and they remain important considering that we still face human rights 
violations. However, the dilemma about its ambivalent structure is related to the 
development of the concept of human rights. The formation process of the notion 
causes the dilemma not only with its ties to a specific ethical-legal code but also 
with its reference to a particular kind of political system, both of which have 
European origins. This is why, when the term ‘human rights’ is instrumentalized 
for humanitarian intervention, it establishes a superiority of one civilization over 
all others, or uniform standards for all countries according to their own priorities.   
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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND NON-
INTERVENTIONISM 
 
2.1. Humanitarian Intervention  
 
Humanitarian intervention and human rights are concepts which go hand in hand 
in debates about accountability and paradoxes of humanitarian intervention in 
international law. This is why in this chapter the concept of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ will be analysed in terms of law and politics with its relation to the 
concept of human rights.  
 Humanitarian intervention may be defined as follows:  
 
[…] the threat of use of force across state borders by a state (or 
group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and 
grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals 
other than its own citizens, without the permission of the 
government of the state within whose territory force is applied.97 
 
  In addition to J. L. Holzgrefe’s definition of humanitarian intervention, 
Fernando R. Teson defines the concept as follows:   
 
[humanitarian intervention is] the proportionate transboundary 
help, including forcible help, provided by governments to 
individuals in another state who are being denied basic human 
rights and who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt 
against their oppressive government.98  
  
We might ask whether there is a clear-cut divide between ‘humanitarian’ 
and other kinds of intervention. Chris Brown points out the rational egoist 
characteristic of states in international relations - according to realist paradigm - 
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and he criticizes any expectation of being ‘humanitarian’ from those states which 
are motivated by egoist selectivity.99 For the questioning of the existence of any 
clear-cut divide between humanitarian and other kinds of intervention, we might 
note that all interventions involve the exercise of power; all involve taking sides 
in local political conflicts and the motives for all interventions are mixed.100 
However, if we go beyond the search for an appropriate definition for the 
term, it is a must to get to the root of humanitarian intervention, which is provided 
by international declarations and agreements. Thus, the restrictions and necessities 
in the Charter of United Nations should be analysed with the intention of grasping 
the processing of humanitarian intervention.  
The paramount international convention which governs the exercise of 
internationally accepted armed force is the Charter of the United Nations. In the 
United Nations Charter, states are restricted to exercising the use of armed force 
by Article 2(4) which states that “All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations.”101 Article 2(7) declares that  
 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter...102 
 
According to these articles, states, armed organisations or international 
organisations are not allowed to intervene in the domestic affairs of states under 
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the restrictions of international law. However, humanitarian intervention debates 
began on how to interpret these articles legally rather than an acceptance of this 
clear end. Article 39 of the UN Charter states that 
 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall 
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken 
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.103 
 
 As seen from the article stated above, the Security Council is responsible 
for protecting international peace, and authorized to decide what measures shall 
be taken in parallel with the necessity of stabilising international peace. Herein 
‘intervention’ eludes its prohibited meaning which is mentioned in Article 2(4) 
and 2(7), and it becomes an instrument to stabilise the international system. The 
dilemma on debates of humanitarian intervention occurs with this duality- that is, 
if it is really a duality.  
Some international lawyers interpret Article 2(4) in a way which stresses 
that it does not forbid the threat or use of force, but rather forbids it when directed 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.104 According 
to this counter-argument, if the humanitarian intervention does not end with a 
territorial conquest, it is not a breach of Article 2(4). Herein it seems that 
international law – by way of interpretation - does not give constant and certain 
resolutions. “This debate, like so many in international law, turns on how to 
interpret the relevant international conventions.”105  
In the following sections will be discussed the legal interpretation of the 
usage of armed forces in the name of humanitarian intervention in terms of the 
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sovereignty principle and the theoretical dilemmas  which can occur  in the course 
of the interpretation of international law.  
 
2.2. Non-Interventionism  
 
Non-interventionism is an attitude which rejects international interventions in 
order to avoid unjust and unequal interference. Fernando R. Teson categorizes 
three basic reactions to humanitarian intervention: the first, ‘absolute non-
interventionism’, claims that use of force can be only justified as a self-defence; 
the second, ‘limited interventionism’ is a thesis which claims that humanitarian 
intervention can be acceptable only if there are extreme human rights violations 
such as mass murder or enslavement; the third, ‘broad interventionism’ is a thesis 
which claims that humanitarian intervention is acceptable in cases of serious 
human rights violations even when it is not genocidal in extent.106 
 The main debate about non-interventionism is shaped by some basic 
arguments such as state sovereignty, calculations in terms of human happiness and 
legality-morality. These discussions will be addressed below.   
 
2.2.1. Sovereignty 
 
As claimed in the previous parts of this chapter, Article 2(4) and Article 2(7) 
emphasise the priority of the state sovereignty principle. The modern international 
relations system established after the Second World War strictly prohibits 
intervening in states’ domestic jurisdiction. The Westphalian order identified strict 
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rules of non-intervention and respected the rights of sovereigns,107 and the new 
world order – the post-Westphalian system - basically collects the same rules to 
stabilise the international relations system. However, as Chris Brown points out:  
 
[t]he Westphalia order was actually characterized by 
interventions of all shapes and kinds, and 1945 was significant 
for two reasons not one; it certainly instituted a set of new human 
rights but it also, for the first time introduced a strict norm of 
non-intervention – in other words both human rights and non-
intervention are substantially new ideas, and it is a mistake to 
regard one as representing an old older displace by the other.108 
 
 Thus, from the starting point to which Brown brings us, until 1945 what 
had shaped the international relations system was all kinds of interventions, and 
what has changed since 1945 is that intervention in a legal sense has been 
prohibited and at the same time human rights have become an important argument 
of international relations. Therefore the existence of the non-interventionist post-
Westphalian order, which delegitimizes humanitarian intervention against state 
sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction, conflicts with the new set of rules which 
brings ‘humanitarian’ aims to the extent of the importance and priority of human 
rights in international relations. Thus, in practice these two parameters of the 
modern international system seem to conflict with one another.  
 However, when the United Nations Charter is analysed more carefully, it 
is possible to see that the strict rule non-intervention has some exceptions, which 
are legally stated in Article 2(7). Article 2(7) continues as follows: “[...] this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII.”109 Chapter VII determines how the United Nations shall deal with 
threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. That is why it 
flouts the rule of non-intervention by authorizing the Security Council to decide 
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under which circumstances a state’s domestic jurisdiction can be intervened in. It 
is obvious that Chapter VII is designed as an exceptional solution to solve the 
problems that emerge when the non-intervention rule and necessity to protect 
human rights meet. However, the non-intervention rule for protecting states’ 
sovereignty remains ambiguous because the application of Article 2(7) might 
result in breaching the rule of non-intervention.  
 Teson, who is against non-interventionist arguments and approaches the 
issue from a liberal perspective, contends that sovereignty does not necessarily 
mean that a state is untouchable or that its authorities may act in whatever way 
they want. He differentiates external self-determination from internal self-
determination in the case of the sovereignty principle, and remarks that “external 
self-determination is the right of peoples to be free from alien rule” such as 
colonial domination.110 On the other hand, internal self-determination is 
associated with the legitimacy of the government inside, and for Teson internal 
self-determination, which is “the right of peoples to establish their own political, 
economic, and cultural institutions without interference from other states”, should 
be our focus when it comes to the debates concerning sovereignty.111 For Teson, 
accepting the humanitarian intervention principle is not denying people’s right to 
independence, because if a government violates the human rights, then it is no 
longer a legitimate power, and internal self-determination requires the government 
to be legitimate and based on the consent of the people.112 He states that “[t]he 
gross violation of human rights is not only an obvious assault on the dignity of 
persons, but a betrayal of the principle of sovereignty itself.”113 Hereby, Teson 
criticises the approach which prioritizes self-determination over individual human 
rights, and interprets the state sovereignty principle in a way that denies the 
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legitimacy of the internal self-determination of a government if there are mass 
human rights abuses by that government.  
 
2.2.2. Utilitarianism  
 
Holzgrefe identifies utilitarianism as a naturalist doctrine which considers an 
action as ’just’ only if its consequences are more favourable than unfavourable to 
all concerned.114 In other words, for utilitarians the consequences of an action are 
more important than the action itself.   
 It is possible to analyse utilitarianism under two different groups: act-
utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism. Act-utilitarians claim that “[...] each human 
action is the proper object of moral evaluation.”115 Briefly, an action is just if its 
immediate and direct consequences are more favourable than unfavourable to all 
concerned. On the other hand, “ ‘rule-utilitarians’ hold that a specific class of 
actions (rules, norms, and maxims) is the proper object of moral evaluation.”116 
Namely, for rule- utilitarians an action can be just if it accords with a set of rules 
which are adapted to aggregate well-being. To give an example to illustrate the 
differences between two of the groups, if we ask whether a military action is 
permissible or not, the answers will be as follows: an act-utilitarian might say that 
military action can be permissible if it saves more lives than it loses; on the other 
hand, a rule-utilitarian’s answer might depend on whether a military action is 
permitted or required by a rule which has a general adherence for the good of 
humankind. Therefore the main difference between these two is that while the 
former is involved with the consequences of the action, the latter looks for a 
general rule that produces the best consequences for all concerned.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114 J. L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 20. 
115 J. L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 21. 
116 J. L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 21. 
  40 
!
 Teson, claiming that strict non-interventionism may be defended on 
utilitarian grounds, specifies two main characteristics to explain why the 
utilitarian argument is against humanitarian intervention: first, the killing of 
innocent people; second, the danger of abuse and partiality by those who 
intervene. The first argument takes into account the possibility of the extensive 
damage that can occur during the use of armed force by the intervention. In such a 
case, interventionist powers defuse not only the group which caused the human 
rights abuses, but also harm innocent people who had already been the target of 
this group’s abuses. Herein, the main interest of utilitarianism is the ‘innocent 
people’ who are damaged as the ‘consequence’ of an act. Thus, from a utilitarian 
perspective, if the consequences are considered - and calculated - it is better not to 
intervene in such a case. The second argument postulates the empirical 
proposition which governments always abuse when they intervene abroad. It 
assumes that during and after the intervention, interventionist powers create a new 
balance of power in their favour, and meanwhile human rights abuses may remain 
in a different way which is highly relevant to an empirical approach.117 Herein, we 
confront the rule-utilitarianist approach which confirms that “[i]t is better to have 
a rule of absolute non-intervention in order to minimize abuses.”118   
 In light of this information, Teson maintains an opposite position against 
the arguments of the utilitarianist approach by accusing the theory of being too 
ready to stigmatize every intervention on behalf of human rights as abusive. For 
him, non-interventionists (utilitarians) seek non-humanitarian reasons behind the 
intervention all the time. He states that  
 
“It is not immoral for a government to act out of humanitarian 
and self-interested motives at the same time. The true test is 
whether the intervention has put an end to human rights 
deprivations... There is nothing wrong in a government trying at 
the time to rescue foreign victims of oppression and legitimately 
to advance the interests of its own citizens, provided that the self-
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interested action does not impair the main humanitarian 
objective.”119 
 
 To support his argument, Teson indicates the situation which experienced 
in Nazi Germany; he states that a particular evil in institutionalized violations of 
human rights can be in a society and those who might monopolize the use of force 
in a political community must be stopped by an intervention. In such a case, the 
intervention can be just even if the interventionist powers infringe upon the rights 
of innocents. For him, such an intervention which contains the infringements of 
the rights of innocents will prevent more abuses than the violators can perpetrate 
in the absence of that intervention.120  
 While Teson’s argument draws attention to the deficient parts of a non-
interventionist utilitarian approach, it still remains deficit in explaining why it is 
necessary to prevent an imperialistic gesture of the humanitarian intervention. In 
this sense, Teson himself becomes an advocate of an imperialist action by 
defending his liberal position.  
 While Teson clamorously associates the utilitarianist argument with the 
non-interventionist approach in his book as if it is the only source of the non-
interventionist argument, Nigel Dower writes that “[...] such an approach 
[utilitarianism] provides no principled objection to the possibility of military 
intervention for the sake of stopping human rights violations.”121 Actually Dower 
might be right if the act-utilitarian approach is considered, because act-utilitarians 
do not refuse any kind of intervention as a de facto constant and/or ‘rule’ under all 
conditions. The situation changes according to the utilitarian calculations. Also, 
for rule-utilitarians, it is not an unalterable fact or rule not to intervene. The rule 
might be changed to the extent that it is adapted to the general welfare of a society 
when utilitarian calculations are considered. Therefore, the utilitarian argument 
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can be a part of a non-interventionist approach, but it is not an argument 
consistent with a principle that is against intervention under all circumstances.  
 
2.2.3. Arguments on Morality and Legality 
 
In the course of humanitarian intervention, ‘responsibility to intervene’ or 
‘responsibility to protect’ does not have a really obvious binding or explicit 
conditions which can be applied in all cases. For instance, in some cases like 
Uganda, Cambodia and Liberia122, the international community did nothing to 
stop the massacre in spite of the fact that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
refers to the United Nations Charter and recognizes the principles of international 
law, rather than customary law123. When we look at the applications of 
interventions, we may see speeches and motives which contain moral concerns.  
 The struggle between law and moral concern and their interpretation may 
be seen in ‘legal positivism’. Legal positivism “[…] as a normative doctrine, is 
the consensualist, collectivist view that norms are just if they are lawful; that if 
they are enacted according to accepted procedures.”124 Thus, for a legal positivist 
it is a moral obligation to obey the law. Herein the moral questioning is irrelevant 
to the fact that if the norm satisfies moral expectations and demands, the content 
of the norm is irrelevant to its binding force.125 This is called the ‘separability 
thesis’ which postulates that binding laws have absolutely no need to reproduce or 
satisfy a certain demand of morality in a society.126  
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 On the other hand, naturalists reject the separability thesis because they 
find no sense in having a moral obligation to obey the law only if it is settled by 
legislative procedures.127 The main argument of naturalists here is that it does not 
have to be a point to obey a law because the legislative power itself also can be 
problematic such as seen in Nazi Germany.  
 The separation of the legal from the moral was discussed in the previous 
chapter under the section on natural law. The duality here occurs because of the 
separation of those two by the reformations in the West. When the 
accommodation between positive and natural (or divine) law ended, sovereigns 
were bent on an understanding of secular law which has historically shifted to 
legal positivism. Thus there is no room for moral decision-making processes in 
the legal positivist understanding.  
In this respect, international law was recognized as essentially depending 
on positive law legitimized by sovereign consent and power. Thomas M. Franck 
sees the struggle which is faced today caused by such a lack of natural law. By 
exiling natural law from international law, legality and morality have become 
problematic. For instance “Commission of Kosovo concluded that NATO’s 
action, while not strictly legal, was legitimate.”128 
 In the light of this information, can humanitarian intervention be just under 
a normative law, or do states have a moral duty to intervene?  
 As for the question of the legality of humanitarian intervention, for legal 
realists if the Security Council fails to end massive human rights abuses, states 
can do so without any authorization according to the contemporary international 
community’s attitude - which includes moral concerns in addition to legal 
regulations.129 Herein we witness the separation of legal realists and classicists, 
because according to the classicist view, unauthorized humanitarian intervention 
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is illegal; in other words, the illegality of unauthorized humanitarian intervention 
is clear in the classicist view. Nonetheless, according to a legal realist view, states 
may be considered unauthorized when the contemporary international 
community’s tendency signifies the necessity for intervention. Also classicists and 
legal realists differ in the case of how to legitimize humanitarian intervention. 
While classicists accept Article 2(4) of the Charter and claim that states are 
banned from using force against both domestic boundaries and other states’ 
political independence, legal realists emphasise Article 39 of the Charter and 
argue that the phrase ‘threat to the peace’ allows the Security Council to intervene  
to end human rights violations, because in the article it is not written that the 
Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to ‘international’ 
peace; in other words, legal realists defend the stance that it does not have to be 
threat to ‘international’ peace: any threat (a state’s domestic issue) can also be a 
reason to intervene.130 
For the question of the morality of humanitarian intervention, Teson says 
that the right of ‘humanitarian intervention is not the law’ and ‘humanitarian 
intervention should not be the law’. 131 He states: 
 
There is a necessary link between international law and moral 
and political philosophy. Finding a response to the question of 
whether it is morally right for nations to intervene on behalf of 
human rights requires an inquiry into the ethical foundations of 
the international legal system. Such inquiry, I shall assume, is 
directly relevant to legal discourse.132 
 
 For Teson, what is legally binding about humanitarian intervention is also 
morally binding, and that these two are inseparable. Instead of accepting a 
positivist (legal positivism) position, Teson defends Grotian tradition which sees 
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international law as an offspring of universal morality.133 For him, these legal 
texts about international law may be deficient when moral concerns emerge. In 
other words, it is moral to intervene.  
 However, to entrust the future of the people to the morality of the 
international community seems as problematic as the strict norm of non-
intervention. To point at universal moral arguments and apply them for each case 
is almost impossible. This is why we face the problem of selectivity. If 
unauthorized interventions seek the common interest of the international 
community, then under different circumstances and in different times variations in 
moral opinion may cause a non-egalitarian treatment which is fed by the 
dominance of powerful states in international relations. At this point, we face the 
problem of naturalist doctrines which arise from our understanding of natural law.  
“Naturalist theories of international justice contend that morally binding 
international norms are an inherent feature of the world; a feature that is 
discovered through reason or experience.”134 In contrast with this approach, 
consensualists advocate that the moral authority of any given international norm 
derives from the explicit or tacit consent of the agents subject to that norm.135  
 This naturalist attitude presumes that there is an approved common virtue 
for all humankind and standards of human rights must be applied by all ‘civilized’ 
states. On the other hand, as Hedley Bull points out, “there is no present tendency 
for states to claim, or for the international community to recognize, any such 
right.”136 In contrast to naturalists, consensualists advocate that there are infinite 
numbers of possible lives, shaped by an infinite number of possible cultures, 
religions, political systems and so on. Although legal positivism, as a 
consensualist theory, fails when it proposes to obey the law and ignore certain 
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demands of morality in a society which has inhuman legislators, it does not insist 
on a common virtue discovered by and applicable to all human beings.  
 To sum up, some lawyers, who can be called legal realists, claim that 
international law can be interpreted in a way in which it is possible to intervene on 
behalf of human rights, with the interventions unauthorized and/or authorized by 
the Security Council through an interpretation of Article 39. On the other hand, 
classicists strongly insist that unauthorized interventions are illegal by considering 
Article 2(4) of the Charter in terms of states’ sovereignty. From the point of view 
of realism, which assumes a Hobbesian approach claiming it is impossible for 
autonomous states to exist without a ‘common power’, or a world government in 
an anarchic world in which therefore there are no moral rules applicable because 
such norms are unenforceable137, naturally a nation’s self-interest will be override 
such moral norms. This does not particularly mean that it is impossible to 
intervene from a realist point of view, but it is almost impossible to intervene with 
the priority of moral goals. The goals that a state (or group of states) might carry 
during the intervention are dependent upon self-interest. Nigel Dower claims that 
it is incoherent to explain ‘humanitarian intervention’ from a realist point of view 
because for him what humanitarian includes is moral goals in this context. That is 
why states intervene to remedy humanitarian atrocities, there is no humanitarian 
aim in these interventions at all – if the intervention is calculated from the realist 
point of view.138  Dower writes: “Of course a realist may accept that a government 
may pursue a ‘humanitarian goal’ by violent intervention; but such action will be 
interpreted as based on calculation of advantage to the country in question.”139  
 On the other hand, advocating moral goals for the practice of humanitarian 
intervention also involves similar problems which a realistic point of view bears. 
To speak of a common moral goal is almost impossible. Thus, when we speak of a 
moral goal for all humankind, we might fall into the error of cultural superiority 
because what we speak of as a general moral goal is up to the dominant cultural 
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structure in international relations. The moral engagements that liberals defend140 
also cause unjust treatments by prioritising one culturally specific value (in this 
context it is a humanitarian aim as a ‘moral’ goal) over all.  
 
2.3. A Global Governance Regime? 
 
So far both the debates in the first chapter (the ambiguity which is occurred by the 
claims - universality, individuality, state’ responsibility and indivisibility – of the 
United Nations’ Model and its Western heritage) and in the second (sovereignty, 
utilitarianism and morality-legality) raise the question as to whether the 
international human rights system is a global governance regime or not. To grasp 
the process deeply, it is necessary to examine how a humanitarian intervention 
process and the decision-making mechanism work. This is, how the unilateral and 
multilateral interventions are put into practice, and will be analysed in the section 
below.  
 
2.3.1. United Nations’ Decision-Making Mechanism  
 
The United Nations has six principle organs – the General Assembly, the Security 
Council, the International Court of Justice, the Economic and Social Council, the 
Trusteeship Council (now defunct) and the Secretariat; of the principle organs, 
only the Court and the Security Council have the power to make legally binding 
decisions.141  Article 24 states that  
 
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
140 See Fernando R. Teson. 
141 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 207-208. 
  48 
!
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.142 
 
 
In other words, Article 24 claims that the Security Council has primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 24 
should be read with the aforementioned Article 39143. Although the decision-
making process of the Council should be legal and the resolutions are legally 
binding, an action which is based on Article 39 is a ‘political’ act144 because 
during the decision-making process, member states ask one another whether an 
action (intervention) is necessary, and if it is necessary what consequences they 
are going to face. In this sense, if the members believe that they have to intervene, 
as Anthony Aust says, they do not indulge in rigorous legal analysis.145  
 The contradiction which occurs because of the inconsistency between 
Article 2(4) and Article 39 deals with an understanding which sees ‘human rights’ 
as an international matter. Accepting ‘human rights’ as an international matter 
provides ‘legality’ to any United Nations intervention because when it is an 
international matter rather than being an internal issue, it becomes legal to 
intervene in terms of Article 39. It is to be noted that intervention is not the only 
measure which can be taken by the United Nations. There are sanctions which 
require states to stop (or prevent their nationals from doing)146, that are 
determined in Article 41 such as “[...] complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means 
of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”.147  
However Article 42 empowers the Security Council to authorise states to 
use force when it considers that the measures which shall be taken would be 
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inadequate or have proven to be inadequate.148 In other words, the Security 
Council does not have to put into practice the sanctions or wait for the sanctions 
to be effective before it authorises the use of force. Aust stresses that “Article 42 
is never expressly mentioned in resolutions, and Articles 43-47, concerning the 
availability of forces to put at the disposal of the United Nations, have always 
been seen as a dead letter.”149 
 After the decision-making process, it should be considered that although 
the Security Council may authorise the member states to use force, it is not an 
obligation to fulfil the task for the members. 
 All these processes (which include a legal text and ‘political’ decisions) 
raise the question of whether the United Nations and the matters it brings with 
itself cause a global governance regime in terms of human rights in the 
international relations or not. 
James W. Nickle, argues that international human rights institutions - 
especially the United Nations - provide an international system for promotion and 
protection of human rights as part of normative globalisation. He claims that 
although this system constitutes a system of global governance in some areas, it 
cannot be termed ‘total’ global governance.150 For him, to be a regime it must be a 
coherent system, and to be a governance regime it must govern, not merely 
preach.151 He also admits that the Security Council is a global governance regime: 
 
[...] the Security Council is global in scope of its concerns and its 
role as a representative of the countries of the world. These 
countries agreed, under the UN Charter, to accept the decisions of 
the Security Council, and hence the power of the Security 
Council is both clearly authorized and incipiently federal. There 
is no doubt that the Security Council is an international 
governance regime.152  
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It is obvious that the United Nations has a global power to authorise an 
intervention by its organs and decision-making mechanism. On the other hand, the 
consensus inside the Security Council has not been established all the time in 
history. This is why the authors are in need of separating the interventions as 
before pre-Cold War and post-Cold War. For instance, Wayne Sandholtz draws 
attention to the fact that before 1990, interventions were generally unilateral, and 
after that date most have been multi-lateral.153 In other words, it should be 
considered that a state may initiate a humanitarian intervention as well as the 
possibility of a UN-initiated multilateral intervention.  
  
2.4. Critique of Humanitarian Intervention Theory: Cultural Superiority and 
Post-Colonial Effects 
 
Critics of humanitarian intervention can be tackled in two ways: first, the 
discourse of humanitarian intervention with its Western oriented arguments 
carries cultural characteristics that can cause the imposition of culturally specific 
values across the boundaries of cultural difference; second, the humanitarian 
intervention is also a discourse which can be the subject of post-colonial debate.  
 For the first peculiarity, almost all humanitarian interventions include the 
expression such as ‘democratisation’, ‘liberation’ and so on, along with the aim of 
halting atrocities. These kinds of purposes are problematic in the sense of being 
‘superior’ and ‘rational’ in the face of another object which is assumed ‘ignorant’ 
or ‘irrational’. Going back to the natural rights-human rights discussion of the 
previous chapter, if we consider that the formation process of the notion has 
reference to a particular kind of political system and specific ethical-legal code, a 
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humanitarian intervention which is fed by this kind of ‘human rights’ interest of 
utilitarianism is the ‘innocent people’ who are damaged as the ‘consequence’ 
between states. If the notion of human rights requires a particular kind of political 
system and specific ethical-legal code, a relationship of superiority is established 
between those who are intervened and those who intervene. Because the former 
does not have this particular kind of political system and specific ethical-legal 
code while the latter has.  
As long as naturalist doctrines of humanitarian intervention, assume the 
existence of morally binding ‘international’ norms – which is quite relevant to the 
idea of ‘universal’ rights of humankind - and accept these norms as an inherent 
feature which can be discovered through reason by ‘rational’ subjects, it continues 
being ignored by culturally specific values which can be an important element 
during the intervention, and insists upon the imposition of these ‘universal’ norms 
over others. In contrast, collectivist approaches of humanitarian intervention seek 
to find another possibility and advocate cultural diversity to criticise one culture’s 
domination in the humanitarian intervention debate. 
 For the second peculiarity, it should be examined in terms of a post-
colonial structure of humanitarian intervention. Anne Orford, who discusses 
humanitarian intervention in terms of global imperialism, criticises the advocates - 
such as Teson - who claim that the best interpretation of international legal 
doctrine allows for the right and duty of humanitarian intervention. She states that 
these advocates of humanitarian intervention “[...] tend not to see any necessary 
relation between such intervention and imperialism, treating international law as 
an agent of liberation from domination by corrupt Third World elites or the 
violence of religious or ethnic groups.”154 Orford rejects the proclamation that a 
renewed international legal text embodied with the creation of the United Nations 
coincides with the birth of a new era of decolonisation. In contrast, she sees 
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humanitarian intervention – as an apparatus of this new system - as intimately 
connected with colonialism, rather than a decisive departure from it.155  
 Orford associates humanitarian intervention discourse with post-
colonialism through two characteristics: first, post-colonial theory postulates the 
possibility that imperialism survived in the era of decolonisation as a largely 
economic rather than territorial enterprise. For Orford, humanitarian intervention 
also includes this economic concern: “[o]ne of the overt aims of pre-conflict ‘aid’ 
programmes, and post-conflict reconstruction, has been establishment of 
necessary conditions to make foreign investment secure and profitable.”156 She 
continues to explain the situation as follows:  
 
[P]ostwar reconstruction guarantees that the people and territories 
of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe continue to 
produce the wealth of Europe and North America, while images 
of the suffering peoples of Third World, and of our benevolence 
in responding to them, are used to provide spiritual enrichment to 
audiences in those wealthy countries.157       
 
The second characteristic of post-colonial theory which she finds relevant 
to humanitarian intervention is that intervention narratives reflect imperialist 
culture by the possibility of the cultural self-representation of the First World. 
What Orford means is that interveners create ‘we’ and ‘others’ to make the 
international community desire not to be like ‘them’. These others are not 
‘civilized’ people; they are so-called ‘ignorant’, ‘child-like’, ‘disordered’, 
‘chaotic’, ‘primitive’, ‘violent’ and even termed ‘monster’ and/or ‘outlaw’.158  
What Orford provides here is a review of international law against the 
traditional understanding of it. She leaves room to realise the association between 
the international law approach and cultural-economic dominance of the historical 
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narratives. Her theory is important in two ways: first, she sees ‘intervention’ as a 
part of an ongoing process in the history of colonialism. Interventionist powers 
also have an economic benefit for those territories in which they intervene, even if 
the claim is to stabilise the area rather than occupy it for land acquisition. The 
second important point to which she draws attention is the ‘monstrosity discourse’ 
that is generally referred to by the interventionist powers. Since this ‘monstrosity’ 
discourse is the issue of the third chapter of the thesis, it will be closely examined 
later. But herein, her critique of international legal doctrine is vital to the extent of 
its opposition to see international legal texts as self-appointed, natural and 
impartial. Unless the necessary connection between international legal doctrine 
and the phenomena behind the apparatuses of this doctrine – which are assumed 
imperialistic in this context - is not seen, humanitarian intervention will keep its 
biased characteristic and its claim to be natural and universal will be rendered 
meaningless.   
Orford’s critiques of humanitarian intervention and mainstream 
international law approach are vital to grasp the elements of intervention, as well 
as in the Libya case. Her theory will be associated with the Libya case below, in 
company with other arguments from critical theory. This is why; the debates 
which are relevant to critiques will be examined more widely in the next chapter.  
To sum up, the basic components of non-interventionism – sovereignty, 
utilitarianism and moral-legal arguments - were discussed for the purpose of a 
critical introduction to interventionism in this chapter. The United Nations’ 
decision-making process was tackled to demonstrate how the mechanism works 
on the interventions. While getting into the discussion of critical approaches to 
humanitarian intervention two steps were used: the thesis defending cultural 
difference and the post-colonial thesis. At the end of the theoretical arguments, the 
Libyan intervention, as a case study, will be discussed with the examples of 
theoretical dilemmas (the ‘collectivist vs. individualist’, the ‘naturalist approach’ 
and the ‘sovereignty dilemma’) which were argued before the introduction of the 
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case study. Therefore, the third chapter includes the debates the ambiguity of 
Libyan Intervention in terms of the theories that were discussed.   
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THE LIBYAN INTERVENTION & GADDAFI’S KILLING  
 
3.1. Libyan Intervention 
 
In the Libyan case, on 15th February, 2011 protests began in Benghazi against 
Gaddafi’s regime. On 26th February, 2011 the UN Security Council declared 
Resolution 1970 after the beginning of civil war. The UN defined its concern 
through Resolution (1970) as follows:  
 
Deploring the gross and systematic violation of human rights, 
including the repression of peaceful demonstrators, expressing 
deep concern at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting 
unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the 
civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan 
government…159 
 
The Resolution (1970) imposed an arms embargo on Libya to stop mass 
atrocities and a travel ban for sixteen people including Gaddafi and his family.160 
Nevertheless, civil war did not end with these restrictions and resolution, which 
were ignored by Gaddafi. Therefore, on 18th March, 2011 the UN Security 
Council discussed the issue a second time and declared Resolution 1973.   
In the Libyan case, humanitarian intervention relied on Resolution 1973 
which aims to take all measures necessary to protect civilians under the threat of 
attack in Libya.161 A ‘no-fly zone’ over Libya was approved by the Security 
Council. NATO forces were used for this multilateral intervention. However, the 
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military intervention conducted under the leadership of France and NATO forces 
joined after the first attack. Obviously, France rushed in to intervene. Despite the 
fact that the intervention, at the beginning, was limited to air strikes which were 
enough to protect the opposition in Benghazi against Gaddafi’s possible attacks, 
in a short time, turned into an offensive and comprehensive operation which 
aimed to topple the regime. Emboldened by NATO air support which turned the 
tide against Gaddafi, the opposition forces marched to Tripoli and forced Gaddafi 
to flee. Ultimately, he was killed by rebels on 20th October, 2011.  
 
3.1.1. Libyan Intervention with the Debates of Theories  
 
So far, some converse theories of human rights and humanitarian intervention 
have been examined. It will be examined how the necessary link between those 
theories and the Libyan intervention can be forged in this order: ‘collectivist vs. 
individualist’, ‘naturalist approach’ and ‘sovereignty dilemma’.  
 Starting with the debate of ‘collectivist or individualist’, contemporary 
human rights norms which originated in the West are in some tension with 
cultural practices of the other parts of the world as mentioned in the previous 
chapters of the thesis. As it was argued before, individualist understanding 
overrides the approach of the United Nations Model of human rights. International 
law tends to hold the rights of human beings as each of them per se ‘individuals’. 
In contrast, the advocates of ‘collective’ rights claim that all cultures are unique 
and that all these cultures have their own tendencies concerning rights. In other 
words, “[...] collectivist theories of international justice maintain that groups - 
typically ethnic groups, races, nations, or states - are proper objects of moral 
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concern.”162 Collective rights are generally propounded against an individualist 
understanding of human rights, especially by African and Asian states. 
  Herein, the main objection of individualists is that it is not possible to 
provide a consensus even in a specific society about what is ‘just’ in terms of 
human rights. In my estimation, the defence of individualism, -and by this way, 
the defence of Western oriented understanding of rights which are generally put 
into practice as if they are ‘universal’- is problematic in this way which assumes 
that the best for humanity arises and comes from the Western value system. On 
the other hand, collective rights can fail when it comes to practice. For instance in 
the Libyan case, it should be considered that the intervention’s legitimacy was not 
suspicious for all parts of the society – in other words, it was acceptable for some 
- and also it was hard to speak of collective rights of Libyan society in this case. It 
was known that Gaddafi and his tribe (al-Qaddadfa) deliberately undermined and 
marginalized the al-Warfalla and al-Magariha tribes.163 Since Gaddafi and his 
tribe had the power and eliminated the other tribes from government, it would be 
difficult to provide a collective rights understanding which comprises all parts of 
society. In this respect, it is hard to expect that the concept of collectivist rights 
work for the Libyan case because it cannot comprise all people in Libya. In other 
words, the Libyan case is a conundrum of collectivist theory. Although we cannot 
see that the Libyan society has a collective attitude for the intervention in this 
case, it does not legitimise the repudiation of cultural diversity and mutable 
accuracy in different cultures by individualist theories which seek to create a 
constant ‘best’ for all human beings.  
 Continuing with the debate of a ‘naturalist approach’, such theories of 
international justice contend that morally binding international norms are an 
inherent feature of the world and that these can be discovered through reason or 
experience. The naturalist approach considerably affects the United States’ 
foreign policy on interventions. In Stewart Patrick’s article, he draws attention to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
162 J. L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” 19.  
163 Fredric Wehrey, “Libya’s Terra Incognita,” Foreign Affairs, February 28, 2011, accessed April 
22, 2014, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67551/frederic-wehrey/libyas-terra-incognita.  
  58 
!
the ‘Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities (PSD-10)’: “The directive 
defines the prevention of mass atrocities as both a core national security interest 
and a core moral responsibility of the United States."164 The United States 
considers that any atrocity can be its own security problem and also ethical 
interest.165  But how can an atrocity be in the United States’ interest? What are the 
ethical codes which provide the intervention’s basis to the United States? It is 
possible to see the naturalist doctrine here. According to the United States’ 
foreign policy understanding, this interest and duty for intervention inherently 
belong to them. Because according to a naturalist approach, the basic principle of 
natural law – and also natural rights - can be discovered through reason and 
therefore these basic principles are achievable for anyone who is capable of 
rational thought. In the PSD-10 case, the United States’ attitude resulted from 
holding the idea that reason was discovered by the United States with their 
capability of rational thought. But there are some states which do not have this 
rational thought capability. Thus the United States considers that its mission here 
is to bring conditions for emancipation to those which are so-called rogue states 
and do not have a rational thought capability to discover these natural rights- 
officially human rights. 
Glancing at the remark of the United States’ president Barack Obama 
concerning the Libyan intervention, he said that “[...] he would not stand by while 
the democratic aspirations spreading across the Middle East were ‘eclipsed by the 
darkest form of dictatorship’ at the hands of a murderous Moammar Gadhafi,” 
and continued “And as president, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and 
mass graves before taking action.”166 If the remark is analysed, first, it can be seen 
that a specific atrocity is linked to a specific political regime which is not 
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democratic. In other words, it confirms the hypothesis stated before, in which the 
language of human rights excludes other possible ways of living and/or other 
kinds of regimes which are not Western; second, the president considers himself 
an agent of emancipatory conditions elsewhere which is quite naturalist. 
For the last discussion, the ‘sovereignty dilemma’, the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ (RtoP) is an important notion that should be considered in terms of the 
definition of sovereignty in the Libyan case.  RtoP is defined in International 
Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP) publications on May 2011 as 
follows: “[...] [RtoP] is an international human rights norm adopted at the UN 
World Summit in 2005 to prevent and stop genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity (often called collectively ‘mass atrocities’).”167 It is 
underlined that Libya was not the first case to which RtoP was applied in this 
cotext. Military operations were legitimised in Libya with the following formula 
which states that “[...] which measures to use at what time is not precise; each 
case will require a tailored response.”168. However, it is not a must to engage a 
military action by applying the formula to other cases. Herein the fine line 
between the sovereignty principle and ‘humanitarian’ aims become ambiguous. 
RtoP offers a new form of sovereignty understanding which claims that 
sovereignty is not a right but a responsibility, and once a state loses the capability 
of this responsibility necessary measures should be taken for ‘humanitarian’ aims 
by the international community.  
 Although it is important to break the mould of conventional state-centred 
sovereignty understanding, it is still biased and open-ended to decide when and 
which state loses control. It is also quite open to a political decision-making 
process which might not be equally applied to all sides of this decision, 
considering the international power relations. In the Libyan case, sovereignty was 
seen and/or interpreted as a responsibility rather than a right, and consequently the 
intervention in Libya was legitimised and made meaningful in terms of the 
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‘humanitarian’ aims of the international community. Samantha Power, who was 
Obama’s adviser and is the 28th United States Ambassador to the United Nations, 
as a key figure, promoted the military intervention in Libya in the United States 
by convincing Obama to push for a United Nation Security Council resolution to 
authorise a coalition military force to protect Libyan civilians.169 Power, as one of 
the initiators of RtoP and Libyan intervention, purports that it is essential for the 
United States to respond to genocide (in any place in the world) with a sense of 
urgency in her book, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide.170 
Power identifies herself as a humanitarian. Libya intervention was a congruent 
move, since she does not acknowledge sovereignty as a right but a duty, and 
Libya had ‘failed’ in its duty to provide the necessary conditions for its citizens to 
gain ‘sovereignty’.  
In my estimation, the real problem here is to determine whether the 
sovereignty initiative policy is applicable to all subjects under equal conditions as 
impartial or political selectivity plays a role for the application of this initiative. If 
political selectivity to the extent of power relations has priority over the 
‘humanitarian’ aims – as it is claimed - then it arrives at the discussion above 
which is argued through the opinions of Anne Orford. It should be considered 
whether this kind of decision-making process has a post-colonial background 
which includes the notion of a so-called third world country being incapable of 
having a right to sovereignty which others have.   
 To sum up, one can mention the following: halting mass atrocity crimes 
and violations of human rights are surely vital; but to ignore cultural specificity 
and inherent values of a group or state is also problematic. Herein, when means 
and ends are considered, halting mass atrocities as an end is notably acceptable 
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but remarks which include liberalising, democratising and so on any state or 
group are problematic in the sense of establishing superior relation over a culture.  
 Crimes against humanity are an important element of not only 
international relations but also everyday life. This thesis has no intention of 
defending these kinds of crimes. On the other hand, all kinds of interventions 
against crimes are not necessarily ‘just’, even though they claim that they have 
‘humanitarian’ bases. Besides, what humanitarian law means is also ambiguous 
and its roots are disputable as argued in the first and second chapters.  
 So far, non-interventionism, the United Nations’ decision-making 
mechanism, interventionist theories and the details of the Libyan intervention 
have been discussed. In the next sections all those theories and information will be 
held from a sociological perspective. Especially, rather than the intervention itself, 
its political and sociological ends and the process of Gaddafi’s killing in terms of 
the lives being open to death will be discussed.  
 
3.2. Analysis of Muammar Gaddafi’s Killing 
 
Going back to 2002, after 9/11 the United States’ (now former) president George 
W. Bush uttered a remark on terror and terrorism. Basically, he said that the threat 
“include[s] the terrorists themselves, who are widely dispersed, and states 
sympathetic to terrorism, particularly those disposed to acquire or further develop 
weapons of mass destruction.”171 Also he declared that it would be considered a 
terrorist attack on the world as a core issue of the United States’ national security. 
According to Tom J. Farer, what has changed with the Bush doctrine is the 
content of the humanitarian intervention. In his article he states that 
“...humanitarian goals do not trigger interventions but are rather a cosmetic 
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applied to counter-terrorist operations...”172 Herein, what terror and terrorist mean 
is up to the declaration of a ‘power’ which sees itself as primus inter pares. This 
remark is important in the sense of including a subject who defines what terror 
and terrorist are. As long as a subject (namely, a sovereign power) defines the 
lines between ‘us’ and ‘others’, it has the power of unilaterally decision-making 
upon an action even if this action has other standards to be defined in terms of 
juridical order. Throughout the next section, this unilaterally decision-making 
mechanism will be examined in the context of dehumanisation, othering and 
exclusion from the zone of law. Afterwards, Gaddafi’s killing will be associated 
with these theoretical debates.  
 
3.2.1. Homo Sacer  
 
What does Gaddafi’s body represent and what is the connection between his 
body’s presentation in the media and the meanings his body carried?   
Agamben stresses that the Greeks had two terms to express life: zoe and 
bios. While the former expresses the simple fact of living which is shared by all 
living being, the latter indicates the form or way of living.173 In his book, Homo 
Sacer, Agamben explains the difference between zoe and bios as follows: neither 
Plato (in Philebus) nor Aristotle (in Nichomachen Ethics) used the term zoe to 
explain ‘life’ in their works; they used bios due to a simple fact that both thinkers 
tackled not a simple natural life but rather a qualified life, a particular way of life, 
simply bios.174 This way of thinking is based on the view that sees zoe as a matter 
of oikos (home); in other words, “... simple natural life [zoe] excluded from the 
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polis in the strict sense, and remains confined - as merely reproductive life - to the 
sphere of the oikos [...]”175 
At this point, it can be beneficial to mention Michel Foucault’s 
‘biopolitics’ to be able to understand Agamben’s idea and critique about 
Foucault’s ‘biopolitical’ approach. Foucault indicates that power over life evolved 
in two basic forms which are not antithetical: the first is called anatomo-politics of 
the human body; the second is called biopolitics of the population.176 What 
Foucault intends to mean by anatomo-politics of the human body which he views 
as the first pole is that it is centred on the body as a machine; “[...] its [body’s] 
disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the 
parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of 
efficient and economic controls [...]”177. All those were ensured by the procedures 
of power that characterized the disciplines. According to Foucault what he terms 
biopolitics formed later in history, and this pole focused on the species body; “[...] 
the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the 
biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life 
expectancy and longevity [...]”178 Foucault says that all those matter’s supervision 
were effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls 
which are called biopolitics of the population.179 All these theoretical inferences 
are based on a fact that Foucault seeks to point out that in the course of the 
classical age, a new kind of power was characterised by all these bipolar 
technologies. This power is described in Foucault’s book as a power whose 
highest function was no longer killing but rather investing life through and 
through.180 
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In this context Foucault’s idea on how the sovereign power has the new 
form of the power of death is important. For Foucault, “[t]he old power of death 
that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the 
administration of bodies and the calculated management of life.”181 By this way, 
the era of biopower begins.  
  Foucault tends to associate politicisation of bare life or the entry of zoe 
into the sphere of polis with modernity by a formation of this new sovereign 
power: “For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal 
with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal 
whose politics places his existence as a living being in question”.182 In contrast to 
Foucault, Agamben tends to see the politicisation of bare life in a frame which 
sees the zoe/bios relationship as an exclusion/inclusion duality. He distinguishes 
himself from Foucault at this point: for Agamben, biopolitics is at least as old as 
the sovereign exception because “[...] the production of a biopolitical body is the 
original activity of sovereign.”183 In this context, Agamben approaches the 
zoe/bios duality as the inclusive exclusion (an exceptio) of zoe in the polis.184 If 
zoe were an exceptio, the politicisation of bare life might exist before modernity. 
On the other hand, how should Agamben’s determination on biopolitics be read, 
while Foucault’s assignations on the modern State’s behaviour, especially on 
subjects, in a biopolitical sense still survive? In other words, if biopolitical body 
were the original activity of the sovereign (and this makes biopolitics as old as the 
sovereign exception) what does Agamben say about the modern state’s behaviour 
in the context of biopolitics to be able to it when compared to the archaic 
sovereign?   
 
[...] biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception. 
Placing biological life at the center of its calculations, the modern 
State therefore does nothing other than bring to light the secret tie 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
181 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality An Introduction: Vol.1, 139-140. 
182 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality An Introduction: Vol.1, 143. 
183 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer Sovereign, 6. 
184 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer Sovereign, 7. 
  65 
!
uniting power and bare life, thereby reaffirming the bond 
(derived from a tenacious correspondence between the modern 
and the archaic which one encounters in the most diverse 
spheres) between modern power and the most immemorial of the 
arcana imperii.185  
 
 For Agamben, the answer to the question of what characterises modern 
politics is not so much the inclusion of zoe in the polis – the politicisation of bare 
life - or  being the life as a principal object of projections and calculations of state 
power 186; it is rather related to the ‘state of exception’. Agamben, in State of 
Exception, does not define the state of exception as a special kind of law (like the 
law of war); rather he tackles the concept as a suspension of the judicial order 
itself; in other words the state of exception defines the law’s threshold or limits its 
concept.187  He says “[t]he modern state of exception is [...] an attempt to include 
the exception itself within the juridical order by creating a zone of indistinction in 
which fact and law coincide.”188 In such a situation modern politics goes hand in 
hand with the state of exception because:   
 
[...] the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which 
the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare 
life-which is originally situated at the margins of the political 
order-gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and 
exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe, right 
and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. At once 
excluding bare life from and capturing it within the political 
order, the state of exception actually constituted, in its very 
separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire political 
system rested.189 
 
In the light of this information, the protagonist of Agamben’s book, homo 
sacer will be touched upon. Homo sacer is someone whose life is open to death 
because of the impunity of his killing and the ban on his sacrifice; namely, it is 
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not permitted to sacrifice this man; on the other hand the one who kills him would 
not be condemned for homicide.190 The term sacer here denotes two different 
meanings: the pure and the impure. The pure and the impure are accepted as if 
they are made from each other. The main difference between normal sacrifice and 
homo sacer lies behind the fact that normal sacrifice brings an object from the 
profane to the sacred or in other words, from ius humanum to ius divinum; 
whereas homo sacer does not belong to the realm of human jurisdiction without 
being brought into the realm of divine law. For this situation, Agamben underlines 
that sacratio takes the form of ‘double exception’; a double exception because of 
being outside both of the ius humanum and ius divinum, both of the sphere of the 
profane and the sphere of the religious.191 According to Agamben, this double 
exception means not only a double exclusion, but also a double capture: “[...] 
homo sacer belongs to God in the form of unsacrificeability and is included in the 
community in the form of being able to be killed. Life that cannot be sacrificed 
and yet may be killed is sacred life.”192 
This ancient character, homo sacer, does not disappear under the 
circumstances of modern democracy in the book. Agamben postulates the 1679 
writ of habeas corpus as the first recorded document in which the bare life 
becomes the new political subject.193 He explains the importance of this document 
as follows:  
 
Whatever the origin of this formula, used as early as the 
eighteenth century to assure the physical presence of a person 
before a court of justice, it is significant that at its center is 
neither the old subject of feudal relations and liberties nor the 
future citoyen, but rather a pure and simple corpus.194 
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 Anymore, the new political subject of the modern era was not only homo 
but also corpus. What Agamben tries to draw to attention here is that the bare life 
shows up in the political area as such taken into the sovereign ban. On the other 
hand, for Agamben, what comes to light in order to be exposed is the body of 
homo sacer, namely bare life. In this way, homo sacer does not disappear but is 
shattered and disseminated into every individual body. In other words, Agamben 
associates the corpus (bare life) with modern democracy in terms of sovereign 
power:   
 
And the root of modern democracy's secret biopolitical calling 
lies here: he who will appear later as the bearer of rights and, 
according to a curious oxymoron, as the new sovereign subject 
(subiectus superaneus, in other words, what is below and, at the 
same time, most elevated) can only be constituted as such 
through the repetition of the sovereign exception and the isolation 
of corpus, bare life, in himself.195 
 
In the light of this information, the case of this thesis – the killing of 
Gaddafi - will be discussed in the context of these theories about corpus (body), 
the power of the sovereign power upon life and death. After the intervention, 
Gaddafi was killed by rebels on 20th October, 2011. His brutal killing196 is 
important in terms of the argument concerning whose life is worth to mourn and 
who decides upon one’s killing without paying a price (impunity).  
When we see the images or watch the videos of Gaddafi’s killing, we 
witness not only the killing of a person, but also killing of a body; a body around 
which politics is centred which allows ‘some’ lives to be terminated without its 
killers being punished.  
On this thesis’ level of analysis, Gaddafi is not accepted as the sovereign 
power since he had lost his power over the other tribes (except al-Qaddadfa) of 
Libya. Also, for this case, organisations imposing international sanctions and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
195 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, 124. 
196 “Full video of Muammar al Gaddafi being tortured and killed - Gaddafi's last words and moments,” 
YouTube video, 2:11, posted by “Ragon theHitman,” September 3, 2013, accessed May 7, 2014,  
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8wtW4Z5d8U.  
  68 
!
international power groups are acknowledged as the ‘power’ which has the 
authority to say whose life is worth mourning. In fact, at some point in history, 
Gaddafi himself represented the sovereign power. However, this thesis inquires 
about the moment when he lost his status as the sovereign power, the moment in 
which the hazardous power relations among the lost national sovereignty and the 
new sovereignty – which were raised out of the intervention - mirrored on 
Gaddafi’s body. This is why, in the following sections, while Gaddafi’s killing 
will be explained in company with the concept of homo sacer, the arbitrary power 
relations among those two understandings of sovereignty should be considered to 
the extent of how they affect the perspective to understand Gaddafi’s judicial and 
moral status.    
Entering the discussion why Gaddafi’s situation is similar to homo sacer, 
firstly international power groups or international organisations did not publicly 
mention that Gaddafi, as a ‘dictator’, should be killed. On the other hand, some 
authorities – discussed below - did not mention (or some addressing this matter 
did not insist on) the application of a proper trial. In this situation, Gaddafi could 
not be killed; but whoever killed him did not appear in court. Namely, his life was 
open to death; it was not permitted to sacrifice him but the one (or ones) who 
killed him would not be condemned for homicide. Herein, a crucial point needs to 
be clarified; Gaddafi was not killed by the international power groups but killed 
by rebels. However this does not make the situation complicated, since France 
admitted that they armed Libyan rebels197 while the United States unlawfully 
provided material support to them198. Thus, it is hard to say that the rebels’ power 
is unconnected to Western support.  
Secondly, as homo sacer belongs to neither the realm of human 
jurisdiction nor the realm of divine law, Gaddafi belongs to the zone of 
indistinction at the moment he was killed. He, of course, did not live his entire life 
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as homo sacer: At some point in history, he himself represented the sovereign 
power. But, in this thesis attention is paid to the moment when he lost power as 
sovereign, when he belonged to neither the profane nor the divine, when he was in 
the zone of indistinction in the state of exception. Herein, we witness how 
Gaddafi transforms from sovereign power to homo sacer in this unique 
phenomenon (the moment he was killed).   
 
At the two extreme limits of the order, the sovereign and homo 
sacer present two symmetrical figures that have the same 
structure and are correlative: the sovereign is the one with respect 
to whom all men are potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer is 
the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns. 
  
 
To grasp how Gaddafi is excluded from the zone of profane and divine 
law; or how he belongs to the zone of indistinction, it can be examined with the 
argument concerning why Gaddafi did not appear in the International Criminal 
Court. Legally, a dictator who violated human rights should have been in the 
International Criminal Court199 according to the regulations of the United Nations. 
On the other hand, there was no serious initiative to emphasise this fact even after 
he was killed. Those responsible for Gaddafi’s killing did not conduct any 
investigation either. Herein, it is noteworthy to mention that international non-
governmental organizations called for an investigation into Gaddafi’s killing and 
indicated that his killing also might be against international law. For instance, on 
21st October, Amnesty International urged an investigation as to whether 
Gaddafi’s death was a war crime200. Also Human Rights Watch said that “The 
National Transitional Council (NTC) in Libya should promptly open an 
independent and impartial investigation with international participation into the 
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deaths of the former leader Muammar Gaddafi and his son Muatassim Gaddafi 
[...]”201. 
In addition to all these, although the NTC has ordered an investigation into 
the death of Gaddafi202, the International Criminal Court did not initiate an 
international investigation.203 
At this point, we are faced with the fact that Gaddafi’s killing does not 
require an investigation into those suspected of killing him. The reason for such 
an approach to this case will be examined and detailed in the next part, but it can 
be concluded that at least on a theoretical level, Gaddafi and his killing do not 
seem to belong to the zone of ‘profane’ law just like homo sacer. This is why, 
despite some NGOs’ demands for an investigation into Gaddafi’s death, it is not 
worth conducting, especially when he is in the zone of indistinction.  
Before getting the discussion of ‘whose life is worth to mourn’, it is 
important to mention once again the transformation of Gaddafi from the sovereign 
power to homo sacer. Agamben seeks the analogy and correspondences in the 
juridico-political status of the bodies of homo sacer and the sovereign. He 
specifies that “[…] there is no juridico-political order… in which the killing of the 
sovereign is classified simply as an act of homicide.”204 As it is known, the killing 
of homo sacer does not constitute homicide. The most important correlation 
between these two cases is that in both, the killing of a man does not constitute an 
offence of homicide.205 In other words, although Gaddafi’s position on the line of 
juridico-political status has been changed, his killing in both roles (the sovereign 
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or homo sacer) would not be classified simply as ‘killing’. In the both cases, 
Gaddafi’s body represents some meanings which are quite similar: 
What unites … homo sacer, and the sovereign in one single 
paradigm is that in each case we find ourselves confronted with a 
bare life that has been separated from its context and that, so to 
speak surviving its death, is for this very reason in compatible 
with the human world.206        
 
3.2.2. Whose Life is Worth to Mourn? 
 
This section begins with some remarks uttered just after Gaddafi was killed. 
These remarks, from the ruling elites and authorities of the Western states, are 
crucial in two terms: first, they will be referred to in the context of Judith Butler’s 
theory on the question of ‘whose life is worth to mourn?’; second, those also 
substantially argue the monstrosity discourse and post-colonial attitude.   
Right after Gaddafi was killed by the rebels, the media started to expose 
his tormented and/or dead body through widespread coverage. During this media 
presentation, Western states’ authorities uttered some remarks which can be 
regarded as a celebration and imply the success of the humanitarian 
intervention.207  
If we examine here the reactions of certain authorities in the mainstream 
media, it is seen that common characteristics of these remarks are striking: 
[Former] French President Nicolas Sarkozy called Qaddafi’s death “a 
milestone in the Libyan people’s battle”208 and said “The disappearance of 
Muammar Gaddafi is a major step forward in the battle fought for more than eight 
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months by the Libyan people to liberate themselves from the dictatorial and 
violent regime imposed on them for more than 40 years.”209 
[Former] Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said that “Now the war 
is over. Sic transit gloria mundi [Thus passes the glory of the world]”210 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that “With this, a bloody war 
comes to an end, which Gaddafi led against his own people. Libya must now 
quickly take further resolute steps towards democracy and make the 
achiev[e]ments so far of the Arab Spring irreversible.”211 
When we examine the remarks of former President of France, Prime 
Minister of Italy and Chancellor of Germany, it is possible to observe two main 
characteristics. Firstly, they assume that his killing would be the end of oppression 
and cruelty in Libya. (This argument will be handled in the next section.) 
Secondly, there is no mention of a trial in the International Criminal Court which 
is the most suitable location according to international criminal law and human 
rights law. Especially, the former President Sarkozy interprets Gaddafi’s killing as 
‘disappearance’; the words chosen here are important because there is a 
connotation between saying ‘disappearance’ and not mentioning a trial. Basically, 
Gaddafi seems here an outlaw as if the one whose appearance in the Court is not 
necessary because only ‘human beings’ may be in the field of law. In other words, 
herein it is a way of determining what to be really ‘human’ – one who can benefit 
from human rights law - is.  
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The Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton shared a laugh with a 
TV news reporter after hearing deposed Libyan leader Gaddafi had been killed.212 
And she made a joke: “We came, we saw, he died”213.  
In spite of the fact that she later called for an investigation about his 
killing214, her first reactions demonstrate that she normalised the situation in 
which a person was killed. Thus we confront here why one’s life cannot be 
grievable in terms of being an ‘outlaw’.  
The normality of the killing of Gaddafi or the futility of grieve/mourning 
brings to mind this question: Whose life is worth to mourn? In this context, of 
course I do not expect the reactions given to the ones responsible for mass 
atrocities and killings to be similar to that of those, for instance, being human 
rights advocates. Nevertheless, when the remarks above are considered, we do not 
see a human being; in contrast, it is something non-human. This is why I use the 
terms ‘grievable’ or  being worth to ‘mourn’ within this discourse; a discourse 
which normalises a death without mentioning its characteristic of taking a ‘life’; 
rather, seeing the issue as a ‘disappearance’.    
Returning to the question ‘whose life is worth to mourn?’ and ‘who 
decides the limits of humanity?’ Judith Butler says that “[...] if a life is not 
grievable, it is not quite a life; it does not qualify as a life and is not worth a note. 
It is already the unburied, if not the unburiable.”215 Butler examines the body’s 
invariably public dimension depending upon Foucault and Agamben’s theories in 
Precarious Life The Powers of Mourning and Violence and she states: 
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Although we struggle for rights over our own bodies, the very 
bodies for which we struggle are not quite ever only our own. 
The body has its invariably public dimension. Constituted as a 
social phenomenon in the public sphere, my body is and is not 
mine. Given over from the start to the world of others, it bears 
their imprint, is formed within the crucible of social life [...]216 
 
 
Herein this inference about the body, which is constituted as a social 
phenomenon in the public sphere, brings the question of whose lives are real. For 
Butler, those whose lives are unreal have already suffered the violence of 
derealisation. Therefore, if the violence is commited against those who have 
unreal lives or are unreal, their lives are not injured or negated because their lives 
have already been negated. This is why Butler states, “[t]hey cannot be mourned 
[...] they are always already lost or, rather, never ‘were,’ and they must be killed, 
since they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness.”217   
If those lives have already been negated and are exposed to violence, what 
is the relationship between the violence by which these ungrievable lives were lost 
and their ungrievability? Butler probes into the ‘dehumanisation’ here and 
emphasises that “[...] the dehumanization emerges at the limits of discursive life, 
limits established through prohibition and foreclosure. There is less a 
dehumanizing discourse at work here than a refusal of discourse that produces 
dehumanization as a result.”218 This is why the violence against those who are 
unreal and are already not quite living, namely living in a state of suspension 
between life and death, leaves a mark that is no mark at all.   
 In light of Butler’s inferences, how may Gaddafi’s killing be examined? 
The remarks mentioned at the beginning of this section demonstrate that his 
killing is not grievable. The words used do not involve any sense which shows us 
a human being was killed. In contrast, there is no mention of this dimension of his 
killing. Therefore Gaddafi, with his killing, leaves a mark that is no mark, a mark 
which is not worth expressing; as if he had never lived or what he had was not 
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‘quite’ a life. In my estimation, this is not irrelevant to the sovereign’s discourse; 
that is Western power in the international relations which identifies whose life is 
worth to mourn or grievable, or who really is a human.  
 
3.2.3. The Dehumanisation of Gaddafi 
 
Returning to the question of why Gaddafi’s killing does not require an 
investigation, the sovereign power determines not only whose life is grievable but 
also who really is human. A proper investigation should be conducted after one 
has been killed, the one who is a human being. In my estimation, the reason of all 
these questions - why his life is not grievable, why his killing is not worth 
investigating or why there was no mention about the need to take one to the 
International Criminal Court - is not irrelevant. In contrast, all these points are 
relevant in the sense of unilateral decision-making mechanism. Considering his 
life ungrievable is a way of ignoring his existence as a human. It is a way of 
reinforcing the monstrosity discourse and deciding unilaterally what will be 
counted as humane (and also ‘human’). Butler rightly refers to a point while 
examining the treatment of Guantanamo Bay prisoners and she criticises the 
United States’ attitude to interpretation of the doctrine (Geneva Convention) 
unilaterally:  
 
[...] in the very moment in which it [the United States] claims to 
act consistently with the doctrine, as it does when it justifies its 
treatment of the Guantanamo Bay prisoners as "humane," it 
decides unilaterally what will count as humane, and openly defies 
the stipulated definition of humane treatment that the Geneva 
Convention states in print.219 
 
Although Guantanamo Bay is not the case of this thesis, it throws light on 
a crucial point of Gaddafi’s case: namely, the way he was treated during his 
killing or the process after he was killed is, actually, independent from the claims 
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of a humanitarian doctrine. And when the Western authorities formed a view on 
his killing, they had the ‘right’ to interpret what humane is. By this means, they 
also had the right to determine who a human is. Clearly, Gaddafi was out of this 
zone, the zone of humanitarian treatment, the zone of unilaterally deciding. 
Gaddafi’s killing (to the extent of decisions which are unilaterally determined by 
dominant powers in the international relations system) shall not be considered as 
the killing of a ‘human’. In contrast, as long as he is out of the field of law, that is 
the zone of indistinction, he is dehumanised.  
Herein, the ambiguity lies behind this paradox; on the one hand, the 
Western world postulates itself as the advocate of human rights and constantly 
indicates the need to raise the standard of human rights; on the other hand, as the 
sovereign power, they have the power to determine who should not be in the zone 
of these standards. It is not a coincidence that the first response to all those 
authorities – stated above - was for a newly ‘liberated’ Libya after the 
‘disappearance’ of a ‘dictator’. Because Gaddafi, in the process leading to his 
killing, was a kind of a figure who, first of all a monster – some ‘thing’ but not 
human - and who was an obstacle in the way of a more ‘Westernized’ Libya. This 
is why his life was not worth mourning nor was worth conducting an investigation 
into his death. Hence his life was open to death, a life which was not ordered to be 
killed but could be killed with the unpunishability of its perpetrators.  
 
3.3. Liberated Libya: Democracy and the End of Mass Atrocities? 
 
In the light of the discussion on dehumanisation, it would be beneficial to examine 
what British Prime Minister David Cameron said after Gaddafi’s killing: "I'm 
proud of the role that Britain has played in helping them to bring that about and I 
pay tribute to the bravery of the Libyans who have helped to liberate their 
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country.”220 And also he pointed out that “...[UK] will help them, we will work 
with them, and that is what I want to say today."221 
If the remark of Prime Minister Cameron is analysed, we may see the 
similar tendency with the United States which is cited previously, Barack 
Obama’s remark. Herein, we again face the attitude to ‘bring’ or to ‘help’ for a 
more liberated system which seems possible with the ‘assistance’ of superior 
powers. (In this remark also there is no mention of the need to bring one to the 
international court for this case.) Similar to the other authorities’ remarks, 
Cameron’s remark implies that Gaddafi’s killing would be the end of oppression 
and cruelty in Libya.   
Herein, mentioning Orford’s idea about the ‘narrative’ of humanitarian 
intervention would be contributive. Orford stresses that “[t]his narrative involves 
the deployment of colonial stereotypes, according to which the native other is 
represented as in need of reform, protection, education and governance.”222 In 
other words, she implies that human rights victims are shown for those who 
identify with the international community. For her, the display of those suffering 
natives or human rights victims serves for establishing the identity of the ‘heroic’ 
international community. In this way, while the international community develops 
a heroic identity, those, who are shown vulnerable, are being centred on the 
politics of the discourse which sees the so-called Third World as “[...] the site of 
the ‘raw’ material that is ‘monstrosity’, is produced for the surplus value of 
spectacle, entertainment, and spiritual enrichment for the ‘First World’”.223 These 
heroic narratives are important in the sense of being an apparatus that masks the 
role played by the international organisational priorities in contributing to the 
humanitarian crises and provides creating ‘valuable’ selves and unified 
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communities. Thus the relationships underpinning the international order may 
seem ‘just’ and ‘ordered’.224   
 Orford’s theory is crucial to the extent of pointing to the necessary 
relationship between post-colonial attitudes (monstrosity/dehumanisation 
discourse) and legitimising the activities of the international community. Since a 
strict border is drawn between ‘we’ and ‘other’ that is monster, vulnerable, failed, 
victim or rogue, the violence carried out in the name of the international 
community is rationalised and legitimised. As Orford says “[t]his attempt to draw 
distinctions between us and them works to erase the violence of practices 
authorised by the international community, such as aerial bombardment, 
economic sanctions or forced economic restructuring.”225  
 Reinforcement of the monstrosity discourse is clearly seen in the remarks 
cited above. Going back to the analysis of Cameron’s remark in the light of 
Orford’s theory, first of all, we may see a figure that is proud of ‘helping’ and 
‘bringing’ liberation. If the question of how all these were brought to Libya is 
asked, we may see many of the violations of international law such as illegally 
arming the rebels, the lack of a call for an investigation and a recall of the 
necessity of the International Criminal Court. But rather, here, the figure is proud 
on behalf of his own state and the international community because a monster is 
toppled by the sensitive and valuable international community and the ‘bravery’ 
of Libyans, no matter which instruments are used and how many violations are 
committed. Thus, as Orford explains, the violence of practices authorised by the 
international community may be erased thanks to the heroic narrative of the 
humanitarian intervention. In other words, no Western authority will be 
responsible of the killing of a person, which is a human rights violation. In 
contrast, judging by remarks, it is not worth speaking of Gaddafi’s killing because 
first he is not a human being but a monster (or dehumanised) and second his 
killing promises a new Libya which would not have conflicts and wars. The 
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second point that can be derived from this remark is related to the theory which 
criticises cultural superiority. It was seen how the monstrosity/ dehumanisation 
discourse legitimises the violations of the international community by Orford’s 
post-colonial critique and in the second dimension of this remark’s analysis, we 
face the attitude that was implied before in this thesis: cultural superiority. Herein 
a Western authority – similar to the other remarks - sees the Western world as the 
saviour of the vulnerable who is incapable of having a proper regime without 
Western assistance. At this point, this power not only determines what the 
standards of a best regime are, but also sees itself as the provider of the best 
political regime and leader. Seeing these ‘victims’ of monstrosity as the ones who 
are incapable achieving a revolution without any Western assistance is quite 
problematic in a way of seeing itself culturally superior.  
Therefore, for this remark (and the other ones cited before), the following 
inferences can be made: first, Western authorities still have the tendency to be the 
saviours of the so-called Third World (a post-colonial attitude). This is why 
Cameron and the other authorities are proud of the role which their states and the 
international community have played. Second, the Libyan people are seen 
incapable of reform or toppling a ruler on their own. Therefore they are mirrored 
as if they need the assistance of the one who has the capacity to reform a system 
or regime (monstrosity, the vulnerable one, and heroic narrative). Third, the 
previous two inferences show that the West still tends to see itself as the one 
which is culturally superior. Because remarks point to nothing but ‘democracy’ 
and ‘liberalisation’ in the Western sense as if these are for the benefit of everyone 
and there is nothing else to be governed. Since democracy is identified with 
Western culture, without the West’s emancipatory politics, it seems almost 
impossible for the Libyan people to ‘achieve’ it on their own.   
In my estimation, all these inferences demonstrate that the post-colonial 
attitude of the Western world and the way of seeing itself culturally superior are 
quite decayed and problematic. Besides, this attitude on humanitarian intervention 
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is also relevant to the understanding of whose life is worth to mourn and who is 
really human. This is why the discussion of this part should be read along with the 
previous discussions; namely, all these questions and cases should be examined 
together.  
It was stated before that Gaddafi was seen and presented as an obstacle in 
the way of a liberated and democratic Libya. This is why, his killing was shown 
as if all Libya’s problems in the sense of being democratic and liberated were 
solved.226 For instance, if we consider European Council President Herman Van 
Rompuy’s remark, “The death of Gaddafi marks the end of an era of despotism 
[...] [Gaddafi’s death] means an end also to the repression from which Libyan 
people have suffered for too long”227 or the remarks of Merkel and Berlusconi – 
cited above - there is a promise which determines Gaddafi’s killing as the end of 
war in Libya. Herein it should be asked whether these promises came true; in 
other words, whether Gaddafi’s killing really provides the peace in Libya. 
Therefore, the question of ‘does this intervention and Gaddafi’s killing really 
prevent and halt mass atrocity crimes?’ will be inquired.  
Did all necessary measures and all kinds of interferences, including 
unlawfully providing material support, work for the benefit of all Libyans? Alex 
Newman claims that some parts of society in Libya were ill-treated by rebels. 
“Soon the rebels' rage focused on people with dark skin in what some analysts 
called genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing,’ sparking condemnation worldwide from 
human-rights groups and officials.”228 Newman states that cities and towns 
formerly occupied by blacks were ultimately ethnically cleansed and destroyed by 
rebels. Speaking by numbers, “[b]y mid-September, the coastal city of about 
10,000 mostly black residents had essentially been wiped off the map.”229 In this 
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article, Newman points out those remaining inhabitants of the city were rounded 
up and shipped to camps by rebel forces and he adds as follows: 
 
Finally, graffiti reading "slaves," "negroes," and "abeed" — a 
derogatory term for blacks — was painted all over the ruins by 
NATO's revolutionaries. The former city then became a "closed 
military area," according to rebels guarding a checkpoint 
interviewed by the McClatchy news service. "Tawarga no longer 
exists," a rebel commander told the Wall Street Journal. Another 
rebel fighter boasted: "We are setting it on fire to prevent anyone 
from living here again."230 
 
 
All this news was gloomy for the future of a ‘liberated’ and ‘democratic’ 
Libya. While the Western powers wished for a new Libya after Gaddafi was 
killed, even before his killing, the rebels who were supported by the West started 
the genocide and ill-treatment. If we examine this case with the principles of 
human rights doctrine, this kind of ill-treatment is clearly human rights violence 
as well as Gaddafi’s attitude to his citizens. Then the attitude of Western powers 
should be questioned, those who identify themselves as the advocates of human 
rights, especially in the sense of their way of being ambiguous. Ambiguity here 
lies in criticising Gaddafi for his human rights abuses while supporting the rebels 
who also commit crimes against humanity.  
 In her review, which was published in November 2011, Nebahat 
Tanriverdi O. draws attention to the problem that the political party tradition in 
Libya is quite weak; this is why the political structure should be restructured and 
armed tribes should be disarmed for political stabilisation.231 Her assignation is 
important to the extent of emphasising the existence of the tribal system in Libya. 
Although the Western authorities tended to emphasise the ‘success’ of brave 
Libyans, they did not urge on the problems that might occur because of the tribal 
system and the power relations between those, in the sense of a successful 
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democracy. Since Gaddafi was killed, political stability could not be achieved. 
One of the most dramatic expressions of continuing instability was the 2012 US 
consulate attack. A mob with firearms burned down the consulate in Benghazi to 
protest a US-made film which ridicules Islam’s Prophet Muhammad. Three 
officers and Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens were killed in this attack.232 The 
important point here is that “[t]here have been indications in recent months that 
radical, armed Islamic groups have gained a foothold in Libya since the fall of the 
Qaddafi regime.”233 As of May 2014, the internal conflicts were not over: Libya 
set a date for parliamentary elections to stave off the possibility of civil war.234 
 All those experiences show that Gaddafi was not the only obstacle in the 
way of Libyan democracy. In fact, there are a lot of elements that should be 
considered such as the lack of political tradition, powerful tribes and intertribal 
strife. Therefore, to introduce Gaddafi’s killing as the day of Libyan democracy is 
problematic as well as ignoring the crimes against humanity by rebels. 
 To sum up this part of the thesis, to grasp the discussions of the ‘global 
mission’ of the international community and Western power groups, and heroic 
narratives which are based on ‘othering’, Butler’s Frames of War will be 
examined. In this book, for the issue of global responsibility in times of war, 
Butler has an inference as follows:  
 
[...] we must be wary of invocations of "global responsibility" 
which assume that one country has a distinctive responsibility to 
bring democracy to other countries. I am sure that there are cases 
in which intervention is important-to forestall genocide, for 
instance. But it would be a mistake to conflate such an 
intervention with a global mission or, indeed, with an arrogant 
politics in which forms of government are forcibly implemented 
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that are in the political and economic interests of the military 
power responsible for that very implementation. In such cases 
[…] this form of global responsibility is irresponsible, if not 
openly contradictory. We could say that in such instances the 
word "responsibility" is simply misused or abused.235 
 
 In addition to this inference, Butler discusses the ‘othering’ during times of 
war. She states that war can be taught as dividing populations into those who are 
grievable and those who are not. This is why, people’s reactions to certain deaths 
vary. “When a population appears as a direct threat to my life, they do not appear 
as ‘lives’, but as the threat to life (a living figure that figures the threat to life).”236 
In my estimation, at the time that Gaddafi appeared as the ‘threat’ to the standards 
of the international society, he did not appear as a life. And the feelings to a death 
have quite strong bonds with the establishing of ‘we’ and ‘others’ (with the 
discussions of both Butler and Orford). “Those we kill are not quite human, and 
not quite alive, which means that we do not feel the same horror and outrage over 
the loss of their lives as we do over the loss of those lives that bear national or 
religious similarity to our own.”237 238 For me, the reason why there was no 
mention of Gaddafi’s killing as a ‘human’ killing in the remarks of Western 
authorities is related to this idea of othering. Gaddafi’s life was not grievable to 
the extent of his situation of being ‘other’ that is the threat. This othering which 
makes Gaddafi a threat also creates the heroic narrative that not only demonstrates 
the Libyans as vulnerable but also hides the failures of the international society.  
 
3.4. The State of Exception 
 
The concept of state of exception is defined in the previous parts with the 
Agambenian perspective. To grasp the complete nature of the concept, the book, 
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State of Exception, will be analysed and the Libyan intervention and Gaddafi’s 
killing will be discussed according to Agamben’s discussions in the last instance.  
 Contrary to what is believed about the concept of ‘state of exception’, 
Agamben does not interpret it as the suspension of the juridical order. He 
differently approaches the concept and asks the question of how such a suspension 
still can be contained within this order. For this question, he explains his idea as 
follows:  
 
In truth, the state of exception is neither external nor internal to 
the juridical order, and the problem of defining it concerns 
precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and 
outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other. 
The suspension of the norm does not mean its abolition, and the 
zone of anomie that it establishes is not (or at least claims not to 
be) unrelated to the juridical order.239 
 
In this context, the state of exception should not be perceived as a concept 
which is unrelated to juridical order. In fact, like homo sacer’s situation as an 
exceptio, the modern state of exception is an attempt to include the exception 
itself within the juridical order. This is why, with an Agambenian perspective, the 
state of exception is no longer a threshold which guarantees articulation between 
an inside and outside, namely between anomie and the juridical context. 
Conversely, “[…] it is, rather, a zone of absolute indeterminacy between anomie 
and law, in which the sphere of creatures and the juridical order are caught up in a 
single catastrophe.”240 
To briefly summarise: first, “[t]he state of exception is not a dictatorship 
[…] but a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all legal 
determinations— and above all the very distinction between public and private—
are deactivated.”241 Second, in line with the first inference, the nature of the acts 
committed during the state of exception seems to escape all legal definitions; in 
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other words, since these acts are “[…] neither transgressive, executive, nor 
legislative, they seem to be situated in an absolute non-place with respect to the 
law.”242 
 When the situation of the Libyan people who were killed by rebels or 
Gaddafi before, during and after the intervention is considered, we face a zone of 
anomie in which all legal determinations are deactivated. The situation in which 
those people lost their lives is not the matter of a juridical order even though 
legally binding international law already exists for this situation; no one was 
brought to account in the state of exception.  
On the other hand, Gaddafi, to the extent he was the standing obstacle, did 
not belong to the realm of any juridical order. Despite the fact that there is an 
international law that can be enforceable in these kinds of situations (War Crimes 
Tribunal, International Criminal Court and so on), Gaddafi was pushed from the 
zone of juridical order to the zone of anomie. As long as Gaddafi was a 
threatening figure for the new juridical order of Libya, he had to be killed. And 
this was quite possible in a state of exception in which the threshold between life 
and death, anomie and zone of the juridical order is blured and nested. As 
Agamben says, “[...] necessity does not acknowledge any law”.243 
 When Gaddafi’s killing and withal Libyan intervention are considered 
along with all discussions in this thesis, we witness a course in which the 
international law and its norms make ambiguous, a certain juridical order is 
replaced with the anomie, and human rights are suspended for a certain part of 
humanity.  
 In my estimation, there are two reasons to examine the case study of this 
thesis with the theory of the state of exception. First, as it was explained, in the 
state of exception, in spite of the existence of a juridical order, subjects belong to 
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the zone of indistinction where the lines between anomie and the juridical order 
blur. In the previous parts of the thesis, I mentioned the unlawful procedures such 
as arming the rebels and intervening in domestic affairs. The Libyan intervention 
has some dimensions which cannot be explained by legal codes. On the other 
hand, it is hard to tell that all legal codes were lifted during the intervention. This 
is why, we face a sovereign power (in this context, it can be Western power 
groups or the international community) which unilaterally decides upon the 
actions as being unlawful or lawful unilaterally. Second, in the state of exception, 
“[…] a human action with no relation to law stands before a norm with no relation 
to life.”244 In other words, we can say that ‘life’ and ‘norm’ are intermingled in 
the state of exception. Gaddafi, as long as he was defined as a monster, was out of 
the field of law rather he belonged to the zone of indistinction in the state of 
exception, the zone where life and norm are intermingled.  
 As it was cited previously, this thesis’s level of analysis is international 
relations. What I mean by ‘zone of indistinction’ should be regarded as the blur 
zone of anomie and the juridical order in terms of international law. This is why 
the sovereign power here are the Western power groups and the international 
community that have the privilege to determine who is human, whose life is worth 
mourning and which intervention is just. In the light of this information, we 
should pay attention to what Agamben says about this political order in the state 
of exception:  
 
Indeed, the state of exception has today reached its maximum 
worldwide deployment. The normative aspect of law can thus be 
obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental 
violence that— while ignoring international law externally and 
producing a permanent state of exception internally—
nevertheless still claims to be applying the law.245 
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 To sum up, in this chapter, I aimed to portray Libya’s situation and 
Gaddafi’s killing in relation of the debates of cultural relativity and post-colonial 
critiques. Also those debates were associated with the theories of Foucault, 
Agamben and Butler on life, outrage, biopolitics and death. In this way, I 
concentrated on the case study with the theoretical debates of the thesis. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the first chapter, I aimed to portray the ambiguous structure of the concept of 
human rights by criticising its claims of universality, individuality, indivisibility 
and state’s sovereignty on rights in conjunction with its ties to natural law. Some 
authors such as Freeman claim that human rights do not imply Western values on 
non-Westerners, this is why human rights universalism is not ‘cultural 
imperialism’.246 Freeman’s counter-argument to those who accuse universalism of 
being cultural imperialism is that the universalism of the origins of human rights 
lies in opposition to Nazi imperialism.247 In this context, he accuses the modern 
forms of rule of producing gross violations of human rights standards.248 In my 
estimation, this counter-argument is insufficient to explain the results of these 
‘violations’. This kind of approach fails to account for the consequences of 
ignoring cultural relativism. For instance, his answer to the advocates of 
relativism who object to human rights universalism for being imperialistic is to 
recall the concept’s origins which were in revulsion against Nazism. However, 
cultural relativism does not necessarily mean the affirmation of Nazism. And it is 
quite possible to defend a system which is against Nazism with the arguments of 
relativism. Of course, the concept is valuable to the extent that it disapproves of 
Nazism, but this does not mean that people should pass over the discussions of 
relativism and accept all forms of universalism just because its defenders laid 
opposition in the course of time in Nazi Germany.    
 As another problematic dimension of the concept of human rights, it was 
argued how the concept was squeezed into the lines of ‘citizenship’ in the first 
chapter. Agamben states that “In the system of the nation-state, the so-called 
sacred and inalienable rights of man show themselves to lack every protection and 
reality at the moment in which they can no longer rake the form of rights 
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belonging to citizens of a state.”249 In other words, Agamben criticises the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, of 1789, because the declaration 
degrades the notion of ‘human’ rights to the rights of ‘citizens’. That is to say, as 
long as one has a citizenship under the power of ‘sovereign power’ (in this 
context, it is the nation-state), he or she can benefit from ‘human’ rights. He 
presents the relationship between ‘birth’ and ‘principal of sovereign’: “The fact 
that in this process the ‘subject’ is, as has been noted, transformed into a ‘citizen’ 
means that birth which is to say, bare natural life as such - here for the first time 
becomes […] the immediate bearer of sovereignty.”250 In spite of the fact that 
Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights claims that all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights251, Agamben argues the 
expression of ‘freedom of a human being’ in a nation-state by biopolitics:  
 
It is not possible to understand the "national" and biopolitical 
development and vocation of the modern state in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries if one forgets that what lies at its basis is 
not man as a free and conscious political subject but, above all, 
man's bare life, the simple birth that as such is, in the passage 
from subject to citizen, invested with the principle of 
sovereignty.252 
 
 I believe that we should not rule out what Agamben draws attention to 
about the links between the nation-state paradigm and the biopolitics on human 
beings (or citizens).  Because, in my estimation, as long as modern sovereignty is 
based on this original fiction which arises out of the continuity between human 
and citizen, and nativity and nationality, it becomes insufficient to grasp and 
provide the standards that human rights claim.  
 Cultural relativism and critiques of the post-colonial approach, which were 
examined in the second and third chapters, are in quite strong relations with the 
debates in the first chapter. In my opinion, these debates of human rights and 
humanitarian intervention are relevant in the sense of reading ambiguous structure 
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settlements and associations. For instance, RtoP, which was analysed in the 
previous chapters, states that “[...] we must remind Member States not to 
undermine RtoP by confusing civilian protection with other motives such as 
regime change or resource control.”253 Herein, we should ask the question of how 
a declaration (namely, a mission) deviates from its aim. Because it is clear that the 
NATO forces and unlawful Western support to rebels caused a regime change. 
This is why, we face here more than a responsibility to humanity. In this thesis, I 
aimed to explain these kinds of contradictions between the lawful and unlawful in 
terms of ambiguous structure of humanitarian intervention.  
 It can be deduced from the thesis: first, human rights with its specific ties 
to Western culture and its value system (the emergence and development of 
natural rights) establish a hierarchy between cultures because of the universality 
claim which aims to generalise norms arising out of Western culture as universal 
facts. Second, in line with the first inference, this universalist understanding of the 
Universal Declaration Model causes a value system over humanitarian 
intervention which is decided whether it is just or unjust unilaterally. This 
characteristic is relevant to the post-colonial attitude which establishes heroic 
narratives about the so-called Third World. While this narrative of humanitarian 
intervention provides for the creation of valuable selves and unified communities, 
it creates an image of a vulnerable, victimised and needy society of so-called 
Third World. In this way, the relationships underpinning the international order 
seem just and orderly. Third, a zone of indistinction is established along with this 
naturalist, universalist and post-colonialist attitude in the state of exception by the 
sovereign power. That is to say, as long as Gaddafi is dehumanised and the 
Libyan society is reflected as if they are in need of the assistance of the ‘liberated’ 
West, all kinds of (lawful or unlawful) interventions will be just and Gaddafi’s life 
will not worth to mourn as a ‘monster’ who is standing as an obstacle in the way 
of a more Western Libya. 
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 Basically, with all these discussions, I aimed to depict the contradictions 
between claims and implementations of humanitarian intervention in terms of 
unilateral decision-making mechanism. In my estimation, it is the same 
(sovereign) power which decides which norms of human rights should be 
universal, which intervention is just or fair, whose life is worth to mourn, and who 
really is human. This is why my concern in this thesis was to analyse these 
unequal forms of association.  
 Finally, I would specify my concern on the critiques: My aim is not to 
legitimise mass human rights violations and atrocities; nor do I suggest lifting the 
concept of human rights with the critical debates cited previously. On the other 
hand, we should be able to criticise these unequal forms of association which 
occur when the humanitarian intervention is instrumentalised for the benefit of 
some ruling elites. Note that Libya is still in a state of exception and it is hard to 
speak of a stable political system there in terms of the humanitarian intervention’s 
promises. As Orford states “[...] in some ways the promise of humanitarian 
intervention may be more damaging to ‘human rights victims’ than grounding 
intervention on security or national interest.”254 
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